Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T19:44:32.334Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2005

Joseph Henrich,
Robert Boyd,
Samuel Bowles,
Colin Camerer,
Ernst Fehr,
Herbert Gintis,
Richard McElreath,
Michael Alvard,
Abigail Barr and
Jean Ensminger
...Show all authors
Joseph Henrich*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322
Robert Boyd*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095
Samuel Bowles*
Affiliation:
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501 and Faculty of Economics, University of Siena, 53100 Siena, Italy
Colin Camerer*
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125
Ernst Fehr*
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, CH-8006, Zurich, Switzerland
Herbert Gintis*
Affiliation:
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501 and Faculty of Economics, Central European University, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary
Richard McElreath*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616
Michael Alvard*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4352
Abigail Barr*
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UL, United Kingdom
Jean Ensminger*
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125
Natalie Smith Henrich*
Affiliation:
ORC Macro, Atlanta, GA 30329
Kim Hill*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-1086
Francisco Gil-White*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196
Michael Gurven*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Frank W. Marlowe*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Peabody Museum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
John Q. Patton*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, California State University, Fullerton, Fullerton, CA 92834-6846
David Tracer*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology and Health and Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado at Denver, Denver, CO 80217
*
jhenric@emory.edu
rboyd@anthro.ucla.edu
bowles@santafe.edu
camerer@hss.caltech.edu
efehr@iew.unizh.ch
hgintis@comcast.net
mcelreath@ucdavis.edu
Alvard@tamu.edu
abigail.barr@economics.ox.ac.uk
jensming@hss.caltech.edu
natalie.henrich@gmail.com
kimhill2@unm.edu
fjgil@psych.upenn.edu
gurven@anth.ucsb.edu
fmarlowe@fas.harvard.edu
johnpatton@exchange.fullerton.edu
dtracer@carbon.cudenver.edu
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators.

Information

Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 6 , December 2005, pp. 838 - 855
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

References

Aaker, J. L. & Lee, A. Y. (2001) “I” seek pleasures and “we” avoid pains: The role of self-regulatory goals in information processing and persuasion. Journal of Consumer Research 28(1):33–49. [ABM]10.1086/321946CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abbink, K., Bolton, G. & Sadrieh, A. (2001) Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior 37:1–25. [rJH]10.1006/game.2000.0837CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acheson, J. (2003) Capturing the commons: Devising institutions to manage the Maine Lobster Industry. University Press of New England. [CH]Google Scholar
Ackerman, J. M., Ledlow, S. E. & Kenrick, D. T. (2003) Friends are family, friends are strangers: Social cognition in social relationships. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Austin, Texas, February 2003. [DTK]Google Scholar
Ainslie, G. (1974) Impulse control in pigeons. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 21:485–89. [TCB]10.1901/jeab.1974.21-485CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ainslie, G. (2001) Breakdown of will. Cambridge University Press. [GA]10.1017/CBO9781139164191CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ainslie, G. (2005) A précis of Breakdown of Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 28(5):635–50. [GA]10.1017/S0140525X05000117CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Alcock, J. (2001) The triumph of sociobiology. Oxford University Press. [DTK]10.1093/oso/9780195143836.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alvard, M. (2004) The ultimatum game, fairness, and cooperation among big game hunters. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 413–35. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J. (1988) Why free ride? Strategies and learning in Public Goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37:291–304. [arJH]10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J. (1995) Cooperation in Public Goods experiments: Kindness or confusion? American Economic Review 85:891–904. [rJH]Google Scholar
Andreoni, J. & Miller, J. H. (2002) Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica 70(2):737–53. [arJH]10.1111/1468-0262.00302CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., Castillo, M. & Petrie, R. (2003) What do bargainers’ preferences look like? Experiments with a convex Ultimatum Game. American Economic Review 93:672–85. [rJH]10.1257/000282803322157034CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ashraf, N., Camerer, C. & Loewenstein, G. (in press) Adam Smith, behavioraleconomist. Journal of Economic Perspectives. [rJH]Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. (1984) The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books. [CH, rJH]Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:1390–96. [rJH]10.1126/science.7466396CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Baerends, G. P. & Drent, R. H. (1982a) The herring gull and its egg. Part I. Behaviour (Suppl.) 17:1–312. [TCB]10.1163/156853982X00599CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baerends, G. P. & Drent, R. H. (1982b) The herring gull and its egg. Part II. Behaviour 82:1–415. [TCB]10.1163/156853982X00599CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, J. M. (1896) Physical and social heredity. American Naturalist 30:422–28. [aJH]Google Scholar
Bandura, A. (1977) Social learning theory. Prentice Hall. [aJH]Google Scholar
Barr, A. (2004) Kinship, familiarity, and trust: An experimental investigation. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographicevidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 305–34. Oxford University Press. [aJH]10.1093/0199262055.003.0010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barry, H., Child, I. L. & Bacon, M. K. (1959) Relation of child training to subsistence economy. American Anthropologist 61:51–63. [aJH]10.1525/aa.1959.61.1.02a00080CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bekoff, M. (2004) Wild justice, cooperation, and fair play: Minding manners, being nice, and feeling good. In: The origins and nature of sociality, ed. Sussman, R. & Chapman, A., pp. 53–79. Aldine. [SFB]Google Scholar
Bendor, J. (1987) In good times and bad: Reciprocity in an uncertain world. American Journal of Political Science 31:531–58. [rJH]10.2307/2111282CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, J. (1993) Uncertainty and the evolution of cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(4):709–34. [rJH]10.1177/0022002793037004007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, J., Kramer, R. & Swistak, P. (1996) Cooperation under uncertainty: What is new, what is true, and what is important. American Sociological Review 61(2):333–38. [rJH]10.2307/2096337CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, J., Kramer, R. M. & Stout, S. (1991) When in doubt: Cooper ation in a noisy Prisoners’Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35(4):691–719. [rJH]10.1177/0022002791035004007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. (1995) Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10:122–42. [RS]10.1006/game.1995.1027CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2005) Natural justice. Oxford University Press. [KB]10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. (1994) An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150:45–71. [KB]Google Scholar
Binmore, K., Gale, J. & Samuelson, L. (1995) Learning to be imperfect: The Ultimatum Game, Games and Economic Behavior 8:56–90. [KB]Google Scholar
Bischof-Kohler, D. (1994) Self object and interpersonal emotions. Identification of own mirror image, empathy and prosocial behavior in the 2nd year of life. Zeitschrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie 202(4):349–77. [ML]Google ScholarPubMed
Bliege Bird, R. L. & Smith, E. A., (2005) Signaling theory, strategic interaction, and symbolic capital. Current Anthropology 46(2):221–48. [EAS]10.1086/427115CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blurton Jones, N., (1984) Selfish origin of human food sharing: Tolerated theft. Ethology and Sociobiology 5:1–3. [aJH]10.1016/0162-3095(84)90030-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blurton Jones, N., (1987) Tolerated theft: Suggestions about the ecology and evolution of sharing, hoarding, and scrounging. Social Science Information 26:31–54. [aJH]10.1177/053901887026001002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bodner, R. & Pr elec, D. (2001) The diagnostic value of actions in a self-signaling model. In: Collected essays in psychology and economics, ed. Brocas, I. & Carillo, J.. Oxford University Press. [GA]Google Scholar
Bolton, G. E. & Zwick, R. (1995) Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior 10(1):95–121. [rJH]10.1006/game.1995.1026CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boone, J. L. (1998) The evolution of magnanimity: When is it better to give than to receive? Human Nature 9(1):1–21. [EAS]10.1007/s12110-998-1009-yCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bowles, S. (1998) Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature 36:75–111. [arJH]Google Scholar
Bowles, S. (2004) Microeconomics: Behavior, institutions, and evolution. Princeton University Press. [rJH]Google Scholar
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (2003) Origins of human cooperation. In: Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation, ed. Hammerstein, P., pp. 429–43. MIT Press. [LRC, EAS, aJH]10.7551/mitpress/3232.003.0024CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyd, R. N. (1988) How to be a moral realist. In: Essays on moral realism, ed. Sayre-McCord, G., pp. 181–228. Cornell University Press. [EM]Google Scholar
Boyd, R. N., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 100(6):3531–35. [arJH]10.1073/pnas.0630443100CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R. N. & Richerson, P. J. (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. University of Chicago Press. [KB, aJH]Google Scholar
Boyd, R. N. & Richerson, P. J. (1988) The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. Journal of Theoretical Biology 132:337–56. [rJH]10.1016/S0022-5193(88)80219-4CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R. N. & Richerson, P. J. (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethnology and Sociobiology 13:171–95. [arJH]10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-YCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyd, R. N. & Richerson, P. J. (1996) Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare. Proceedings of the British Academy 88:77–93. [arJH]Google Scholar
Boyd, R. N. & Richerson, P. J. (2002) Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. Journal of Theoretical Biology 215:287–296. [rJH]10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandt, H. & Sigmund, K. (2004) The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 231(4):475–86. [rJH]10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.032CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Brandt, R. B. (1959) Ethical theory: The problems of normative and critical ethics. Prentice-Hall. [EM]Google Scholar
Brandts, J., Saijo, T. & Schram, A. (2004) How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite and cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Public Choice 119:381–424. [SG]10.1023/B:PUCH.0000033329.53595.1bCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brendl, C. M., Markman, A. B. & Messner, C. (2003) Devaluation of goalunrelated choice options. Journal of Consumer Research 29:463–73. [ABM]10.1086/346243CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, M. B. (1997) On the social origins of human nature. In: The message of social psychology, ed. McGarty, C. & Haslam, A., pp. 54–62. Blackwell. [LRC]Google Scholar
Brewer, M. B. (2003) Taking the social origins of human nature seriously: Toward a more imperialist social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review 8:107–13. [LRC]10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brewer, M. B. & Caporael, L. R. (in press) An evolutionary perspective on social identity: Revisiting groups. In: Evolution and social psychology, ed. Simpson, J. A., Schaller, M. & Kenrick, D. T.. Psychology Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Brink, D. O. (1989) Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. Cambridge University Press. [EM]10.1017/CBO9780511624612CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brosnan, S. F. (in press) Nonhuman species’ reactions to inequity and their implications for fairness. Journal of Social Justice. [SFB]Google Scholar
Brosnan, S. F. & de Waal, F. B. M. (2003) Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature 425(18): 297–99. [SFB, rJH]10.1038/nature01963CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Brosnan, S. F., Freeman, C. & de Waal, F. B. M. (submitted) Partner's behavior, not reward distribution, determines success in an unequal cooperative task in capuchin monkeys. American Journal of Primatology. [SFB]Google Scholar
Brosnan, S. F., Schiff, H. C. & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005) Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 272(1560):253–58. [SFB]Google ScholarPubMed
Bryan, J. H. (1971) Model affect and children's imitative altruism. Child Development 42(6):2061–65. [aJH, ML]10.2307/1127607CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bryan, J. H. & Walbek, N. H. (1970) Preaching and practicing generosity: Children's actions and reactions. Child Development 41(2):329–53. [aJH]10.2307/1127035CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bshary, R. & Schäffer, D. (2002) Choosy reef fish select cleaner fish that provide high-quality service. Animal Behaviour 63:557–64. [RJS]10.1006/anbe.2001.1923CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchan, N. & Croson, R. (2004) The boundaries of trust: Own and others’ actions in the US and China. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55(4):485–504. [TCB]10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchan, N., Croson, R. & Dawes, R. (2002) Swift neighbors and persistent strangers: A cross-cultural investigation of trust and reciprocity in social exchange. American Journal of Sociology 108(1):168–206. [SG]10.1086/344546CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burlando, R. M. & Guala, F. (2005) Heterogeneous agents in public good experiments. Experimental Economics 8:35–54. [DJZ]10.1007/s10683-005-0436-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burnham, T. C. (2003) Engineering altruism: A theoretical and experimental investigation of anonymity and gift giving. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50(1):133–44. [TCB]10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00044-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burnham, T. C. & Hare, B. (in press) Engineering cooperation: Does involuntary neural activation increase public goods contributions? Human Nature. [TCB]Google Scholar
Call, J., Brauer, J., Kaminski, J. & Tomasello, M. (2003) Domestic dogs (Canisfamiliaris) are sensitive to the attentional state of humans. Journal of Comparative Psychology 117(3):257–63. [TCB]10.1037/0735-7036.117.3.257CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F. (1996) Rules for experimenting in psychology and economics, and why they differ. In: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten, ed. Guth, W.& van Damme, E.. Springer-Verlag. [aJH]Google Scholar
Camerer, C. F. (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press. [KB, TCB, SG, arJH, DJZ]Google Scholar
Camerer, C. F. & Ho, T.-H. (1999) Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica 67(4):827–75. [rJH]10.1111/1468-0262.00054CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F. & Hogarth, R. (1999) The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review of capital-labor-production framework. Cal Tech Social Science Working Paper, 1059. [aJH]10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F. & Thaler, R. H. (1995) Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictator s and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9:209–19. [DBK]10.1257/jep.9.2.209CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F. & Weber, M. W. (1992) Recent developments in modelling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:325–70. [aJH]10.1007/BF00122575CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F. & Weigelt, K. (1988) Experimental tests of a sequential equilibrium reputation model. Econometrica 56:1–36. [rJH]10.2307/1911840CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G. & Prelec, D. (2005) Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics. Journal of Economic Literature 42:9–64. (Reprinted in Italian in Sistemi Intelligenti 2004(16):337–48.) [rJH]10.1257/0022051053737843CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, L. (1999) Raising the stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental evidence from Indonesia. Economic Inquiry 37(1):47–59. [arJH, EM]10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01415.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, D. T. (1965) Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In: Social change in developing areas: A reinterpretation of evolutionary theory, ed. Barringer, H. R., Glanksten, G. I. & Mack, R. W., pp. 19–49. Schenkman. [aJH]Google Scholar
Caporael, L. R. (1997) The evolution of truly social cognition: The core configurations model. Personality and Social Psychology Review 1:276–98. [LRC]10.1207/s15327957pspr0104_1CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Caporael, L. R. (2001) Parts and wholes: The evolutionary importance of groups. In: Individual self, relational self, and collective self, ed. Sedikides, C. & Brewer, M. B., pp. 241–58. Psychology Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Caporael, L. R. (2003) Repeated assembly. In: Alternative approaches to evolutionary psychology, ed. Schur, S. & Rauscher, F., pp. 71–90. Kluwer. [LRC]10.1007/978-1-4615-0267-8_4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caporael, L. R., Dawes, R. M., Orbell, J. M. & van de Kragt, A. J. C. (1989) Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12:683–739. [LRC, aJH]10.1017/S0140525X00025292CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cardenas, J. C. (2000) How do groups solve local commons dilemmas? Lessons from experimental economics in the field. Environment, Development and Sustainability 2:305–22. [EO]10.1023/A:1011422313042CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cardenas, J. C. (2005) Double-blind Dictator Game: Sanquianga. Paper presented at the Roots of Human Sociality Conference, April 14–17, 2005, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. [rJH]Google Scholar
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J. & Willis, C. (2000) Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out. World Development 28(10):1719–33. [EO]10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carpenter, J., Burks, S. & Verhoogen, E. (2005) Comparing students to workers: The effects of social framing on behavior in distribution games. In: Field experiments in economics, ed. Carpenter, J., Harrison, G. & List, J. A.. JAI Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Carpenter, J., Harrison, G. & List, J. A. (2005) Field experiments in economics. JAI Press. [RS]Google Scholar
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. & Feldman, M. (1981) Cultural transmission and evolution. Princeton University Press. [aJH]Google ScholarPubMed
Chaiken, S. (1980) Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39:752–66. [TY]10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G. & Rabin, M. (2002) Social preferences: Some simple tests of a new model. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3):817–69. [aJH]10.1162/003355302760193904CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chase-Dunn, C. & Grimes, P. (1995) World-systems analysis. Annual Review of Sociology 21:387–417. [TD]10.1146/annurev.so.21.080195.002131CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cherry, T., Frykblom, P. & Shogren, J. (2002) Hardnose the dictator. American Economic Review 92:1218–21. [VLS]10.1257/00028280260344740CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chow, C., Wagner, L. & Lucas, M. (2005) Fair game: Preschool children show sophisticated understanding on economic tasks. Poster presented at the 17th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Society, Los Angeles, CA, May 26–29, 2005. [ML]Google Scholar
Clark, M. S. & Grote, N. K. (2003) Close relationships. In: Handbook of psychology: Personality and social psychology, vol. 5, ed. Millon, T. & Lerner, M. J., pp. 447–61. Wiley. [SFB]10.1002/0471264385.wei0518CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cole, M. (1996) Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Harvard University Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Cole, M. & Engestrom, Y. (1993) A cultural-historical approach to distributed cognition. In: Distributed cognitions, ed. Salomon, G., pp. 1–46. Cambridge University Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Crook, J. H. & Crook, S. J. (1988) Tibetan polyandry: Problems of adaptation and fitness. In: Human reproductive behavior: A Darwinian perspective, ed. Betzig, L., Borgerhoff-Mulder, M. & Turke, P., pp. 97–114. Cambridge University Press. [DTK]Google Scholar
Davies, N. (1981) Human sacrifice in history and today. Morrow. [GA]Google Scholar
Davies, T., Shah, R., Ling, K. & Trochet, R. (in preparation) Intuitive preference aggregation: Tests of independence and consistency. [TD]Google Scholar
Dawkins, R. (1990) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press. [ML]Google Scholar
DeBruine, L. M. (2002) Facial resemblance enhances trust. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B 269:1307–12. [DBK]10.1098/rspb.2002.2034CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
de Quervain, D. J., Fischbacher, U., T reyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E., (2004) The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305:1254–58. [aJH]10.1126/science.1100735CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
de Waal, F. B. M., (2000) Attitudinal reciprocity in food sharing among brown capuchin monkeys. Animal Behavior 60:253–61. [ML]10.1006/anbe.2000.1471CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Waal, F. B. M., (2005) How animals do business. Scientific American 291:72–79. [VLS]10.1038/scientificamerican0405-72CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M., (2003) Capuchin cognitive ecology: Cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia 41:221–28. [SFB]10.1016/S0028-3932(02)00152-5CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Diamond, J. M. (1997) Guns, germs, and steel: The fates of human societies. W. W. Norton. [rJH]Google Scholar
Doris, J. M. & Stich, S. P. (forthcoming) As a matter of fact: Empirical perspective on ethics. In: The Oxford handbook of contemporary analytic philosophy, Jackson, F. & Smith, M.. Oxford University Press. [EM]Google Scholar
Duman, R. S., Heninger, G. R. & Nestler, E. J. (1997) A molecular and cellular theory of depression. Archives of General Psychiatry 54:597–606. [DJZ]10.1001/archpsyc.1997.01830190015002CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Durham, W. H. (1991) Coevolution: Genes, culture, and human diversity. Stanford University Press. [aJH]10.1515/9781503621534CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckel, C. & Grossman, P. (1996) Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior 16:181–91. [rJH]10.1006/game.1996.0081CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eisenberg, N. & Mussen, P. H. (1989) The roots of prosocial behavior in children. Cambridge University Press. [rJH]10.1017/CBO9780511571121CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elliot, R. & Vasta, R. (1970) The modeling of sharing: Effects associated with vicarious reinforcement, symbolization, age, and generalization. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 10:8–15. [aJH]10.1016/0022-0965(70)90038-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ensminger, J. (1992) Making a market: The institutional transformation of an African society. Cambridge University Press. [CH]Google Scholar
Ensminger, J. (2002) Experimental economics: A powerful new method for theory testing in anthropology. In: Theory in economic anthropology, ed. Ensminger, J., pp. 59–78. Altamira Press. [rJH]Google Scholar
Ensminger, J. (2004) Market integration and fairness: Evidence from ultimatum, dictator and public goods experiments in East Africa. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 356–81. Oxford University Press. [aJH]10.1093/0199262055.003.0012CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ensminger, J. (2005) Double blind versus standard Dictator Games: U.S. and Orma. Paper presented at the Roots of Human Sociality Conference, April 14–17, 2005, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. [rJH]Google Scholar
Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2003) The nature of human altruism: Proximate patterns and evolutionary origins. Nature 425:785–91. [rJH, EAS]10.1038/nature02043CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. & Gächter, S. (2002) Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13:1–25. [arJH]10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. (2000a) Cooper ation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 90(4):980–95. [KB, SG, aJH]10.1257/aer.90.4.980CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. (2000b) Fair ness and r etaliation: The economics of reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:159–81. [DJZ]10.1257/jep.14.3.159CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415:137–40. [aJH]10.1038/415137aCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E. & Henrich, J. (2003) Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? On the evolutionary foundations of human altruism. In: The genetic and culturalevolution of cooperation, ed. Hammerstein, P., pp. 55–82. MIT Press. [rJH, EAS]10.7551/mitpress/3232.003.0006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:817–68. [GG, arJH]10.1162/003355399556151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J. & Sutton, R. I. (2005) Economics language and assumptions: How theories can become self-fulfilling. Academy of Management Review 30:8–24. [TD]10.5465/amr.2005.15281412CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferraro, P. J. & Cummings, R. G. (2005) Cultural diversity, discrimination and economic outcomes: an experimental analysis. Experimental Working Paper 2003–002 (revised 1/05), Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA Fishbach, A., Friedman, R. S. & Kruglanski, A. W. (2003) Leading us not into temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology 84(2):296–309. [ABM]Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U., Fong, C. M. & Fehr, E. (2002) Fair ness and the power of competition. Unpublished manuscript, University of Zurich. [arJH]Google Scholar
Fiske, A. P. (1992) The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review 99:689–723. [DTK]10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.689CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fiske, A. P. & Tetlock, P. E. (1997) Taboo trade-offs: Reactions to transactions that transgress the spheres of justice. Political Psychology 18(2):255–97. [ABM]10.1111/0162-895X.00058CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fiske, S. T. (2003) The discomfort index: How to spot a really good idea whose time has come. Psychological Inquiry 14:203–208. [LRC]10.1207/S15327965PLI1403&4_4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frank, R. H. (2001) Cooperation through emotional commitment. In: Evolutionand the capacity for commitment, ed. Nesse, R. M., pp. 57–76. Russell Sage Foundation. [EAS]Google Scholar
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. D. & Regan, D. T. (1993) Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:159–71. [GA, TD]10.1257/jep.7.2.159CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D. (1998) The theory of learning in games. MIT Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B. & Thöni, C. (in preparation) Understanding determinants of social capital: Cooperation and informal social sanctions in a cross-societal perspective. University of Nottingham. [SG]Google Scholar
Gale, J., Binmore, K. G. & Samuelson, L. (1995) Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game. Games and Economic Behavior 8:856–90. [DJZ]10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gangestad, S. W. & Buss, D. M. (1993) Pathogen prevalence and human mate preferences. Ethology and Sociobiology 14:89–96. [DBK]10.1016/0162-3095(93)90009-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gardner, R., Herr, A., Ostrom, E. & Walker, J. A. (2000) The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources. Journal of Development Economics 62:515–33. [EO]10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00095-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. & the ABC Research Group (1999) Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press. [CH, rJH]Google Scholar
Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D. (2001) A theory of case-based decisions. Cambridge University Press. [DJZ]10.1017/CBO9780511493539CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gil-White, F. (2004) Ultimatum game with an ethnicity manipulation: Results from Khovdiin Bulgan Cum, Mongolia. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 260–304. Oxford University Press. [arJH]10.1093/0199262055.003.0009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gintis, H. (2000) Game theory evolving. Princeton University Press. [TCB, arJH]Google Scholar
Gintis, H. (2003a) The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: Gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms. Journal of Theoretical Biology 220(4):407–18. [arJH]10.1006/jtbi.2003.3104CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gintis, H. (2003b) Solving the puzzle of prosociality. Rationality and Society 15(2):155–87. [aJH]10.1177/1043463103015002001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R. & Fehr, E. (2003) Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 24:153–72. [rJH, EAS]10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gintis, H., Smith, E. A. & Bowles, S. L. (2001) Costly signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 213(1):103–19. [rJH, EAS]10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Greenfeld, L. (2001) The spirit of capitalism: Nationalism and economic growth. Harvard University Press. [WJ]Google Scholar
Grusec, J. E. (1971) Power and the internalization of self-denial. Child Development 42(1):93–105. [aJH, ML]10.2307/1127067CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grusec, J. E. & Kuczynski, L. (1997) Parenting and children's internalization of values: A handbook of contemporary theory. Wiley. [aJH]Google Scholar
Grusec, J. E., Saas-Kortsaak, P. & Simutis, Z. M. (1978) The role of example and moral exhortation in the training of altruism. Child Development 49(3):920–23. [aJH]10.2307/1128273CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gurven, M. (2004a) Does market exposure affect economic game behavior? The ultimatum game and the public goods game among the Tsimane of Bolivia. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 194–231. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gurven, M. (2004b) Economic games among the Amazonian Tsimane: Exploring the roles of market access, costs of giving, and cooperation on pro-social game behavior. Experimental Economics 7:5–24. [EAS]10.1023/A:1026256404208CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. & Schwarze, B. (1982) An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3(4):367–88. [TCB, RG, rJH]10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108:814–34. [TY]10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haley, K. & Fessler, D. (2005) Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior 26(3):245–56. [TCB, rJH, EAS, RJS]10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour, Parts I and II. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7:1–52. [EAS]10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hampton, R. R. (1994) Sensitivity to information specifying the line of gaze of humans in sparrows (Passer domesticus). Behaviour 130(1–2):41–51. [TCB]10.1163/156853994X00136CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harbaugh, W. T. & Krause, K. (2000) Children's altruism in public goods and dictator experiments. Economic Inquiry 38(1):95–109. [aJH]10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00006.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harbaugh, W. T., Krause, K. & Liday, S. G. (2002) Bargaining by children. Available at: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2002-4_Harbaugh_Kid_Bargaining.pdf. [arJH]10.2139/ssrn.436504CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harbaugh, W., Krause, K. & Liday, S. (2004) Bargaining in children. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Oregon. [ML]10.2139/ssrn.436504CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardin, G. (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–48. [EO]10.1126/science.162.3859.1243CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hare, B., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2001) Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour 61(1)139–51. [TCB]10.1006/anbe.2000.1518CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harman, G. (1977) The nature of morality. Oxford University Press. [EM]Google Scholar
Haskell, T. (1985) Capitalism and the origins of the humanitarian sensibility (Parts 1 and 2). American Historical Review 90(2):339–61; 90(3):547–66. [WJ]10.1086/ahr/90.2.339CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haskell, T. (1998) Objectivity is not neutrality. Johns Hopkins University Press. [WJ]10.56021/9780801856815CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haskell, T. & Teichgraeber, R., eds. (1993) The culture of the market. Cambridge University Press. [WJ]Google Scholar
Hauser, M., Chen, K., Chen, F . & Chuang, W. (2003) Give unto other s: Genetically unrelated cotton-top tamarin monkeys preferentially give food to those who altruistically give food back. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Biology 270:2363–70. [rJH, ML]10.1098/rspb.2003.2509CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayashi, N., Ostrom, E., Walker, J. & Yamagishi, T. (1999) Reciprocity, trust, and the sense of control. Rationality and Society 11(1):27–46. [aJH]10.1177/104346399011001002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2000) Does culture matter in economic behavior: Ultimatum game bargaining among the Machiguenga. American Economic Review 90(4):973–80. [aJH, RS]10.1257/aer.90.4.973CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2002) Decision-making, cultural transmission and adaptation in economic anthropology. In: Theory in economic anthropology, ed. Ensminger, J., pp. 251–95. Rowman and Littlefield. [rJH]Google Scholar
Henrich, J. (2004a) Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53:3–35. [rJH]10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00094-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2004b) Inequity aversion in capuchins? Nature 428:139. [rJH]10.1038/428139aCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (in press) A cultural species. In: Explaining culture scientifically, ed. Brown, M.. University of Washington Press. [rJH]Google Scholar
Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. (2001) Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 208:79–89. [arJH]10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Henrich, J. & Gil-White, F. (2001) The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior 22(3):165–96. [aJH]10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00071-4CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Henrich, J. & Henrich, N. S. (in press) Culture and the origins of cooperation. Oxford University Press. [arJH]Google Scholar
Henrich, J. & McElreath, R. (2002) Are peasants risk-averse decision makers? Current Anthropology 43(1):172–81. [aJH]10.1086/338291CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. & Smith, N. (2004) Comparative experimental evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, and American populations. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 125–67. Oxford University Press. [arJH]10.1093/0199262055.003.0005CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camer er, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., eds. (2004) Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies. Oxford University Press. [KB, arJH, EM, RS]10.1093/0199262055.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H. & McElreath, R. (2004) Overview and synthesis. In: Foundations of human sociality, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H., pp. 8–54. Oxford University Press. [GG]10.1093/0199262055.003.0002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Higley, J. D., Linnoila, M. & Suomi, S. J. (1994) Ethological contributions. In: Handbook of aggressive and destructive behavior in psychiatric patients, ed. Hersen, M., Ammerman, R. T. & Sisson, L. A.. Plenum Press. [DJZ]Google Scholar
Higley, J. D., Thompson, W. W., Champoux, M., Goldman, D., Haesert, M., Kraemer, G. W., Scanlan, J. M., Suomi, S. J. & Linnoila, M. (1993) Paternal and maternal genetic and environmental contributions to cerebrospinal fluid monoamine metabolites in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Archives of General Psychiatry 50:615–23. [DJZ]10.1001/archpsyc.1993.01820200025003CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hill, E. & Sally, D. (2004) Dilemmas and bargains: Autism, theory of mind, cooperation and fairness. University College London. [aJH, ML]Google Scholar
Hill, K. & Gurven, M. (2004) Economic experiments to examine fairness and cooperation among the Ache Indians of Paraguay. In: Foundations in Human Sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 382–412. Oxford University Press. [GG, arJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0013CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirshleifer, J. (1987) On the emotions as guarantors of threats and promises. In: The latest on the best: Essays on evolution and optimality, ed. Dupré, J., pp. 307–26. MIT Press. [EAS]Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, J. (2001) Game-theoretic interpretations of commitment. In: Evolution and the capacity for commitment, ed. Nesse, R. M., pp. 77–98. Russell Sage Foundation. [EAS]Google Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. & Smith, V. (1994) Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Game and Economic Behavior 7:346–80. [TD, arJH, VLS]10.1006/game.1994.1056CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A. & Smith, V. L. (1996a) On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. International Journal of Game Theory 25(3):289–301. [aJH]10.1007/BF02425259CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. & Smith, V . L. (1996b) Social distance and otherregarding behavior in dictator games. American Economic Review 86(3):653–60. [TCB, VLS]Google Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A. & Smith, V. L. (1998) Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: Experimental economics and evolutionary psychology. Economic Inquiry 36:335–52. [arJH]10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howell, S. (1997) Introduction. In: The ethnography of moralities, ed. Howell, S., pp. 1–24. Routledge. [WJ]Google Scholar
Hruschka, D. & Henrich, J. (in press) Friendship, cliquishness, and the emergence of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. [rJH]Google Scholar
Hück, S. & Oechssler, J. (1999) The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations. Games and Economic Behavior 28:13–24. [rJH]10.1006/game.1998.0691CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hull, D. L. (1988) Science as a process. University of Chicago Press. [LRC]10.7208/chicago/9780226360492.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Humphrey, C. (1997) A exemplars and rules: Aspects of the discourse of moralities in Mongolia. In: The ethnography of moralities, ed. Howell, S., pp. 25–49. Routledge. [WJ]Google Scholar
Hutchins, E. (1996) Cognition in the wild. MIT Press. [LRC, CH]Google Scholar
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C. & Rizzolatti, G. (1999) Cortical mechanisms of imitation. Science 286:2526–28. [GA]10.1126/science.286.5449.2526CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
International Labour Organisation (2000) Cost of Social Security – World Labour Report 2000. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/socfas/research/stat/table14.htm. [RG]Google Scholar
Irons, W. G. (2001) Religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment. In: Evolution and the capacity for commitment, ed. Nesse, R. M., pp. 292–309. Russell Sage Foundation. [EAS]Google Scholar
Jankowiak, W. (2004) Market reform and the expansion of China's moral horizon. In: Well being, family affections, and ethical nationalism in urban China, ed. Jankowiak, W.. Special issue of The Journal of Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 33(24):167–210. [WJ]Google Scholar
Johnson, A. (2003) Families of the forest: Matsigenka Indians of the Peruvian Amazon. University of California. [aJH]Google Scholar
Johnson, A. & Earle, T. (2000) The evolution of human societies (2nd edition). Stanford University Press. [aJH]10.1515/9780804764513CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, D., Stopka, P. & Knights, S. (2003) The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature 421:911–12. [rJH]10.1038/421911bCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jones, D. (2000) Group nepotism and human kinship. Current Anthropology 41(5):779–809. [EAS]10.1086/317406CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jordan, B. (1999) Begging: The global context and international comparisons. In: Begging questions: Street-level economic activity and social policy failure, ed. Dean, H., pp. 43–62. Policy Press. [RG]Google Scholar
Joshi, N. V. (1987) Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes. Journal of Genetics 66(1):69–84. [rJH]10.1007/BF02934456CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kachelmeier, S. & Shehata, M. (1997) Internal auditing and voluntary cooperation in firms: A cross-cultural experiment. The Accounting Review 72(3):407–31. [SG, aJH]Google Scholar
Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E., eds. (1995) Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press. [KB, aJH]10.1515/9780691213255CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982) Judgement under uncertainty. Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511809477CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, H., & Hill, K., (1985) Food sharing among Ache foragers: Tests of explanatory hypotheses. Current Anthropology 26:223–45. [aJH]10.1086/203251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenrick, D. T. & Keefe, R. C. (1992) Age preferences in mates reflect sex differences in human reproductive strategies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:75–133. [DTK]10.1017/S0140525X00067595CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenrick, D. T. & Li, N. P. (2000) The Darwin is in the details. American Psychologist 55:1060–61. [DTK]10.1037/0003-066X.55.9.1060CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kenrick, D. T. & Sundie, J. M. (in press) Dynamical evolutionary psychology and mathematical modeling: Quantifying the implications of qualitative biases. In: The evolution of mind: Fundamental questions and controversies, ed. Gangestad, S. W. & Simpson, J. A.. Guildford Press. [DTK]Google Scholar
Kenrick, D. T., Becker, D. V., Butner, J., Li, N. P . & Maner, J. K. (2003a) Evolutionary cognitive science: Adding what and why to how the mind works. In: From mating to mentality: Evaluating evolutionary psychology, ed. Sterelney, K. & Fitness, J., pp. 13–38. Psychology Press. [DTK]Google Scholar
Kenrick, D. T., Li, N. P. & Butner, J. (2003b) Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision-rules and emergent social norms. Psychological Review 110:3–28. [DTK]10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiyonari, T., Tanida, S. & Yamagishi, T. (2000) Social exchange and reciprocity: Confusion or a heuristic? Evolution and Human Behavior 21:411–27. [rJH, DBK, TY]10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00055-6CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Knez, M. J. & Camerer, C. F. (1995) Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 10(1):65–94. [aJH]10.1006/game.1995.1025CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kohn, M. (1990) Position in the class structure and psychological functioning in the U.S., Japan, and Poland. American Journal of Sociology 95:964–1008. [aJH]10.1086/229382CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kollock, P. (1997) Transforming social dilemmas: group identity and cooperation. In: Modeling rational and moral agents, ed. Danielson, P., pp. 186–210. Oxford University Press. [rJH]Google Scholar
Kraemer, G. W., Ebert, M. H., Schmidt, D. E. & McKinney, W. T. (1989) A longitudinal study of the effect of different social rearing conditions on cerebrospinal fluid norepinephrine and biogenic amine metabolites in rhesus monkeys. Neuropsychopharmacology 2:175–89. [DJZ]10.1016/0893-133X(89)90021-3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kurzban, R. (2001) The social psychophysics of cooperation: Nonverbal communication in a public goods game. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 25(4):241–59. [TCB]10.1023/A:1012563421824CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laham, S. M., Gonsalkorale, K. & von Hippel, W. (2005) Darwinian grandparenting: Preferential investment in more certain kin. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31:63–72. [DTK]10.1177/0146167204271318CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J. & Feldman, M. W. (2000) Niche construction, biological evolution, and cultural change. Behavavioral and Brain Science 23:131–75. [LRC]10.1017/S0140525X00002417CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Larrick, R. P. & Blount, S. (1997) The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72(4):810–25. [aJH]10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.810CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Branscombe, N. R. & Doosje, B. (2003) Malicious pleasure: Schadenfreude at the suffering of another group. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84:932–43. [GA]10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.932CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ledlow, S. E. & Linder, D. E. (2003) Kinship, familiarity and frame in a simulated social dilemma. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Psychological Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, May 2003. [DTK]Google Scholar
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) Public Goods: A survey of experimental research. In: Handbook of experimental economics, ed. Kagel, J. & Roth, A., pp. 111–94. Princeton University Press. [KB, aJH]10.1515/9780691213255-004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, A. Y., Aaker, J. L. & Gardner, W. (2000) The pleasur es and pains of distinct self-construals: The role of interdependence in regulatory focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78(6):1122–34. [ABM]10.1037/0022-3514.78.6.1122CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leimar, O. & Hammerstein, P. (2001) Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences 268(1468):745–53. [rJH]10.1098/rspb.2000.1573CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lesorogol, C. (2005a) Double-blind dictator game: Samburu. Paper presented at the Roots of Human Sociality Conference, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, April 14–17, 2005. [rJH]Google Scholar
Lesorogol, C. (2005b) Experiments and ethnography: Combining methods for better understanding of behavior and change. Current Anthropology 46:129–36. [RS]10.1086/427099CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M. & Ross, L. (2004) The name of the game: Predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner’s dilemma game moves. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30:1175–85. [TD]10.1177/0146167204264004CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lilly, A., Nix, P., Mehlman, P. T., Higley, J. D., Ward, G., Taub, D. M. & Brown, G. L (1992) Effect of PCPA in a male rhesus monkey with an extremely deviant CNS serotonin metabolism disorder. American Journal of Primatology 27:44. [DJZ]Google Scholar
List, J. A. & Cherry, T. L. (2000) Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers. Experimental Economics 3:11–31. [aJH]10.1023/A:1009989907258CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loewenstein, G. (1999) Experimental economics form the vantage point of view of behavioral economics. Economic Journal 109:F25–F34. [aJH]10.1111/1468-0297.00400CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L. & Bazerman, M. H. (1989) Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57(3):426–41. [SFB]10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.426CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Low, B. S. (1990) Marriage systems and pathogen stress in human societies. American Zoologist 30:325–39. [DBK]10.1093/icb/30.2.325CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books. [EM]Google Scholar
Markman, A. B. & Medin, D. L. (2002) Decision making. In: Stevens handbook of experimental psychology, ed. Medin, D. L. & Pashler, H., pp. 413–66. Wiley. [ABM]Google Scholar
Marlowe, F. W. (2004a) Dictators and ultimatums in an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers: The Hadza of Tanzania. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 168–93. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marlowe, F. W. (2004b) What explains Hadza food sharing? In: Research in Economic Anthropology: Socioeconomic aspects of human behavioral ecology, vol. 23, ed. Alvard, M., pp. 67–86. JAI Press. [aJH, EAS]Google Scholar
Martignon, L., Vitouch, O., Takezawa, M. & Forster, M. R. (2003) Naive and yet enlightened: From natural frequencies to fast and frugal decision trees. In: Thinking: Psychological perspective on reasoning, judgment, and decision making, ed. Hardman, D. & Macchi, L., pp. 189–211. Wiley. [rJH]10.1002/047001332X.ch10CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, G. B. & Clark, R. D. (1982) Distress crying in neonates: Species and peer specificity. Developmental Psychology 18:3–9. [ML]10.1037/0012-1649.18.1.3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marwell, G. & Ames, R. E. (1981) Economists free ride, does anyone else? Journal of Public Economics 15:295–310. [TD]10.1016/0047-2727(81)90013-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. & Smith, V. L. (1996) Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 93:13421–28. [VLS]10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. & Smith, V. L. (2003) Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 52:267–75. [VLS]10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00003-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McElreath, R., Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. (2003) Shared norms can lead to the evolution of ethnic markers. Current Anthropology 44(1):123–29. [aJH]10.1086/345689CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Medin, D. L., Goldstone, R. L. & Markman, A. B. (1995) Comparison and choice: Relations between similarity processing and decision processing. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 2(1):1–19. [ABM]10.3758/BF03214410CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Metcalfe, J. & Mischel, W. (1999) A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review 106:3–19. [TY]10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M. & Ramirez, F. O. (1997) World society and the nation-state. American Journal of Sociology 103:144–81. [TD]10.1086/231174CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Midlarsky, E. & Bryan, J. H. (1972) Affect expressions and children's imitative altruism. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 6:195–203. [aJH]Google Scholar
Miles, D. R. & Carey, G. (1997) Genetic and environmental architecture of human aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72:207–17. [DJZ]10.1037/0022-3514.72.1.207CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Milinski, M., Semmann, D. & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proceedings of the RoyalSociety of London, Series B 269:881–83. [EAS]10.1098/rspb.2002.1964CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Miller, D. T. (1999) The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist 54:1–8. [TD]10.1037/0003-066X.54.12.1053CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mischel, W. & Liebert, R. M. (1966) Effects of discrepancies between observed and imposed reward criteria on their acquisition and transmission. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3:45–53. [aJH]10.1037/h0022696CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mohtashemi, M. & Mui, L. (2003) Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism. Journal of Theoretical Biology 223(4):523–31. [rJH]10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00143-7CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Monroe, K. (1996) The heart of altruism: Perception of a common humanity. Princeton University Press. [WJ]Google Scholar
Murnighan, J. K. & Saxon, M. S. (1998) Ultimatum bargaining by children and adults. Journal of Economic Psychology 19(4):415–45. [aJH]10.1016/S0167-4870(98)00017-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. 2005 Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton University Press. [EO]10.1515/9781400829484CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nowak, M. A., Page, K. M. & Sigmund, K. (2000) Fairness versus reason in the Ultimatum Game. Science 289(5485):1773–75. [rJH]10.1126/science.289.5485.1773CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Olson, M. (1965) The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press. [EO]Google Scholar
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R. & van de Kuilen, G. (2004) Cultural differences in ultimatum experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics 7:171–88. Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpex/0401003.html [SG, RG, rJH]10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orbell, J. M., van de Kragt, A. J. C. & Dawes, R. M. (1988) Explaining discussion induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40:45–51. [RS]Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. (2005) Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press. [EO]Google Scholar
Ostrom, E. & Walker, J. (2003) Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Russell Sage Foundation. [EO]Google Scholar
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. & Walker, J. (1994) Rules, games, and common-poolresources. University of Michigan Press. [EO]Google Scholar
Oxenstierna, G., Edman, G., Iselius, L., Oreland, L., Ross, S. B. & Sedvall, G. (1986) Concentrations of monoamine metabolites in the cerebrospinal fluid of twins and unrelated individuals: A genetic study. Journal of Psychiatric Research 20:19–20. [DJZ]10.1016/0022-3956(86)90020-8CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Paciotti, B. & Hadley, C. (2003) The ultimatum game in southwestern Tanzania: Ethnic variation and institutional scope. Current Anthropology 44:427–32. [RS]10.1086/374903CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paciotti, B., Hadley, C., Holmes, C. & Borgerhoff Mulder, M. (2005) Grass-roots justice in Tanzania. American Scientist 93:58–65. [RS]10.1511/2005.51.952CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, K. M. (2000) A generalized adaptive dynamics framework can describe the evolutionary Ultimatum Game. Journal of Theoretical Biology 209:173–79. [rJH]10.1006/jtbi.2000.2251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Page, T., Putterman, L. & Unel, B. (2003) Voluntary association in Public Goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry, and efficiency. Working paper. [rJH]10.2139/ssrn.314705CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. (2003) A tale of two defectors: The importance of standing for the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 224:115–26. [TCB, rJH]10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. (2004) Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432:499–502. [rJH, EAS]10.1038/nature02978CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Parsons, T. (1967) Sociological theory and modern society. Free Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Patton, J. Q. (2004) Coalitional effects on reciprocal fairness in the ultimatum game: A case from the Ecuadorian Amazon. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 96–124. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Patton, J. Q. (2005) Meat sharing for coalitional support. Evolution and Human Behavior 26(2):137–57. [EAS]10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppe, J. T. (1986) The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 19:123–205. Academic Press. [TY]10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60214-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pillutla, M. M. & Chen, X.-P. (1999) Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas: The effects of context and feedback. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 78(2):81–103. [aJH]10.1006/obhd.1999.2825CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Presbie, R. J. & Coiteux, P. F. (1971) Learning to be generous or stingy: Imitation of sharing behavior as a function of model generosity and vicarious reinforcement. Child Development 42(4):1033–38. [aJH, ML]10.2307/1127789CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, M. E. (2005) Punitive sentiment among the Shuar and in industrialized societies: Cross-cultural similarities. Evolution and Human Behavior 26:279–87. [DBK]10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Price, M. E., Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2002) Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. Evolution and Human Behavior 23:203–31. [rJH]10.1016/S1090-5138(01)00093-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pruitt, D. G. & Kimmel, M. J. (1977) Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology 28:363–92. [DBK]10.1146/annurev.ps.28.020177.002051CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pulliam, H. R. & Dunford, C. (1980) Programmed to learn: An essay on the evolution of culture. Columbia University Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Pyszczynski, T. & Greenberg, J. (1987) Toward an integration of cognitive and motivational perspectives on social inference: A biased hypothesis-testing model. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 20:297–340. [TY]10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60417-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quartz, S. R. & Sejnowski, T. J. (1997) The neural basis of cognitive development: A constructivist manifesto. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20:537–96. [DJZ]10.1017/S0140525X97001581CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rachlin, H. (1970) Introduction to modern behaviorism. Freeman. [TCB]Google Scholar
Rapoport, A. & Chammah, A. (1965) Prisoner's dilemma. University of Michigan Press. [TCB]10.3998/mpub.20269CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press. [EM]10.4159/9780674042605CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reeves, L. M. & Weisberg, R. W. (1994) The role of content and abstract information in analogical transfer. Psychological Bulletin 115:381–400. [DJZ]10.1037/0033-2909.115.3.381CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rege, M. & Telle, K. (2004) The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations. Journal of Public Economics 88(7–8):1625–44. [TCB]10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rice, M. E. & Grusec, J. E. (1975) Saying and doing: Effects of observer performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32:584–93. [aJH]CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R. (2000a) Climate, culture and the evolution of cognition. In: The evolution of cognition, ed. Heyes, C. M., pp. 329–45. MIT Press. [rJH]10.7551/mitpress/2872.003.0025CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R. (2000b) Complex societies: The evolutionary dynamics of a crude superorganism. Human Nature 10:253–89. [aJH]10.1007/s12110-999-1004-yCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R. (2005) Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. University of Chicago Press. [rJH]Google Scholar
Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. T. & Henrich, J. (2003) Cultural evolution of human cooperation. In: The genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation, ed. Hammerstein, P., pp. 357–88. MIT Press. [EAS]10.7551/mitpress/3232.003.0021CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rogoff, B. (2003) The cultural nature of human development. Oxford University Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Rosenthal, T. L. & Zimmerman, B. J. (1978) Social learning and cognition. Academic Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Ross, L. & Ward, A. (1996) Naive realism: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In: Values and knowledge, ed. Brown, T., Reed, E. & Turiel, E.. Erlbaum. [aJH]Google Scholar
Roth, A. E. (1995) Bargaining experiments. In: The handbook of experimental economics, ed. Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E., pp. 253–48. Princeton University Press. [aJH]10.1515/9780691213255-006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A. E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M. & Zamir, S. (1991) Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review 81(5):1068–95. [arJH]Google Scholar
Rubinstein, A. (1998) Modeling bounded rationality. MIT Press. [DJZ]10.7551/mitpress/4702.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ruffle, B. & Sosis, R. (in press) Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: a field test on Israeli kibbutzim and city residents. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. [RS]Google Scholar
Rushton, J. P. (1975) Generosity in children: Immediate and long term effects of modeling, preaching, and moral judgement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31:459–66. [aJH]10.1037/h0076466CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rushton, J. P., Fulker, D. W., Neale, M. C., Nias, D. K. B. & Eysenck, H. J. (1986) Altruism and aggression: the heritability of individual differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50:1192–98. [DJZ]10.1037/0022-3514.50.6.1192CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rutter, M. L. (1997) Nature-nurture integration: The example of antisocial behaviour. American Psychologist 52:390–98. [DJZ]10.1037/0003-066X.52.4.390CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sally, D. (1995) Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A metaanalysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Society 7:58–92. [KB, aJH]10.1177/1043463195007001004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, L. (2001) Adaptations, analogies and anomalies. Journal of Economic Theory 97:320–66. [rJH]10.1006/jeth.2000.2754CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E. & Cohen, J. D. (2003) The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science 300:1755–58. [aJH]10.1126/science.1082976CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shanks, D. R. & St. John, M. F. (1994) Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17:367–447. [DJZ]10.1017/S0140525X00035032CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sherif, M. I. (1937) An experimental approach to the study of attitudes. Sociometry 1:90–98. [aJH]10.2307/2785261CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sherman, P. W. & Hash, G. A. (2001) Why vegetable recipes are not very spicy. Evolution and Human Behavior 22:147–64. [DTK, DBK]10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00068-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Silk, J. B., Brosnan, S. F., Vonk, J., Henrich, J., Povinelli, D. J., Richardson, A. S., Lambeth, S. P., Mascaro, J. & Shapiro, S. J. (2005) Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members. Nature 437:1357–59. [rJH]10.1038/nature04243CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slonim, R. & Roth, A. E. (1998) Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic. Econometrica 66(3):569–96. [aJH]10.2307/2998575CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A. (1759/1966) The theory of moral sentiments, ed. Millar, A., Kincaid, A. & Bell, J.. Kelley, A. M.. (Originally published in 1759).10.1093/oseo/instance.00042831CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, E. A., & Bliege Bird, R., (2000) Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: Public generosity as costly signaling. Evolution and Human Behavior 21(4):245–61. [TCB]10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00031-3CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Smith, M. (1993) Realism. In: A companion to ethics, ed. Singer, P., pp. 399–410. Blackwell. [EM]Google Scholar
Smith, M. S., Kish, B. J. & Crawford, C. B. (1987) Inheritance of wealth as human kin investment. Ethology and Sociobiology 8:171–81. [DTK]10.1016/0162-3095(87)90042-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, V. L. (1998) The two faces of Adam Smith. Southern economic association distinguished guest lecture. Southern Economic Journal 65:1–19. [VLS]Google Scholar
Smith, V. L. (2003) Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. American Economic Review 93:465–508. [VLS]10.1257/000282803322156954CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosis, R. & Alcorta, C. (2003) Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior. Evolutionary Anthropology 12(6):264–74. [EAS]10.1002/evan.10120CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosis, R. & Ruffle, B. (2003) Religious ritual and cooperation: Testing for a relationship on Israeli religious and secular kibbutzim. Current Anthropology 44:713–22. [RS]10.1086/379260CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosis, R. & Ruffle, B. (2004) Ideology, religion, and the evolution of cooperation: Field tests on Israeli kibbutzim. Research in Economic Anthropology 23:89–117. [RS]10.1016/S0190-1281(04)23004-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugiyama, L. S., Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2002) Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 99:11537–42. [DTK]10.1073/pnas.122352999CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sullivan, R. J. & Allen, J. S. (1999) Social deficits associated with schizophrenia defined in terms of interpersonal Machiavellianism. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 99:148–54. [RJS]10.1111/j.1600-0447.1999.tb07213.xCrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sullivan, R. J., Allen, J. S., Otto, C., Tiobech, S. & Nero, K. (2000) The effects of chewing betel nut (Areca catechu) on the symptoms of people with schizophrenia in Palau, Micronesia. British Journal of Psychiatry 177:174–78. [RJS]10.1192/bjp.177.2.174CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Taylor, C. (1964) The explanation of behaviour. Humanities Press. [WJ]Google Scholar
Taylor, C. (1992) The ethics of authencity. Harvard University Press. [WJ]10.4159/9780674237117CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tenbrunsel, A. E. & Messick, D. E. (1999) Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly 44(4):684–707. [ABM]10.2307/2667052CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tinbergen, N. (1968) On war and peace in animals and man. An ethologist’s approach to the biology of aggression. Science 160:1411–18. [TCB]10.1126/science.160.3835.1411CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomasello, M. (1999) The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press. [arJH]Google Scholar
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T. & Moll, H. (2005) Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(5):675–91. [aJH]10.1017/S0140525X05000129CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tracer, D. (2003) Selfishness and fairness in economic and evolutionary perspective: An experimental economic study in Papua New Guinea. Current Anthropology 44(3):432–38. [arJH, EAS]10.1086/374904CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tracer, D. (2004). Market integration, reciprocity, and fairness in rural Papua New Guinea: Results from a two-village ultimatum game experiments. In: Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies, ed. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., pp. 232–59. Oxford University Press. [aJH, EAS]10.1093/0199262055.003.0008CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Triandis, H. C. (1995) Individualism and collectivism. Westview Press. [EF]Google Scholar
Trivers, R. L. (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46(1):35–57. [TCB, RJS]10.1086/406755CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992) Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323. [aJH]10.1007/BF00122574CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R. & Ostr om, E. (1990) Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19:203–11. [EO]10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-BCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2005) Young children and chimpanzees help others to achieve their goals. Poster presented at the Society for Research on Child Development Biennial Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, April 7–10, 2005. [ML]Google Scholar
Watabe, M., Terai, S., Hayashi, N. & Yamagishi, T. (1996) Cooperation in the oneshot Prisoner's Dilemma based on expectations of reciprocity. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36:183–96. [rJH]Google Scholar
Weber, M. (1904/1958) The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Charles Scribners. [GA]Google Scholar
Weibull, J. W. (1995) Evolutionary game theory. MIT Press. [aJH]Google Scholar
Wilson, M. & Daly, M. (2004) Do pretty women inspire men to discount the future? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 271 (Suppl. 4):177–79. [TCB]10.1098/rsbl.2003.0134CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wilson, E. O. (1975) Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Harvard University Press. [LRC]Google Scholar
Woodburn, J. (1968) An introduction to Hadza ecology. In: Man the hunter, ed. Lee, R. B. & DeVore, I., pp. 49–55. Aldine. [aJH]Google Scholar
Young, H. P. (1998) Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton University Press. [arJH]10.1515/9780691214252CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist 35:151–75. [TY]10.1037/0003-066X.35.2.151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zelizer, V. A. (1994) The social meaning of money. Basic Books. [ABM]Google Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2002a) Between utility and cognition: The neurobiology of relative position. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48:71–91. [DJZ]10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00227-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2002b) Neurobiological measurements of cardinal utility: Hedonimeters or learning algorithms? Social Choice and Welfare 19:477–88. [DJZ]10.1007/s003550100122CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2003a) Empirical evidence on interdependent preferences: Nature or nurture? Cambridge Journal of Economics 27:867–80. [DJZ]10.1093/cje/27.6.867CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2003b) You are not in my boat: Common fate and similarity attractors in bargaining settings. Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 167, University of Oxford. Available at: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/pdf/paper167.pdf [DJZ]Google Scholar
Zizzo, D. J. (2005) Transfer of knowledge and the similarity function in economic decisionmaking. In: Transfer of knowledge in economic decision making, ed. Zizzo, D. J.. Palgrave Macmillan. [DJZ]Google Scholar