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Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Susan Dwyer
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, CanadaH3A 2T7; sue@philo.mcgill.ca

Abstract

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upon domain-general changes in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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