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moral heuristics and the means/end distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

barbara h. fried
Affiliation:
law school, stanford university, stanford, ca 94305 bfried@stanford.edu http://www.stanford.edu
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Abstract

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a mental heuristic is a shortcut (means) to a desired end. in the moral (as opposed to factual) realm, the means/end distinction is not self-evident: how do we decide whether a given moral intuition is a mere heuristic to achieve some freestanding moral principle, or instead a freestanding moral principle in its own right? i discuss sunstein's solution to that threshold difficulty in translating “heuristics” to the moral realm.

Information

Type
open peer commentary
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press