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Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2005

Edouard Machery,
Daniel Kelly and
Stephen P. Stich
Edouard Machery*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/
Daniel Kelly*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882
Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-2882 http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
*
machery@pitt.edu
dankelly@rci.rutgers.edu
stich@ruccs.rutgers.edu
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Abstract

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We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 6 , December 2005, pp. 830
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005