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Nature's subtlety undermines the empirical relevance of both dynamical and computational hypotheses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Gregory R. Mulhauser
Affiliation:
Cognitive Systems Research, Applied Research and Technology, British Telecom Laboratories, Martlesham Heath IP5 3RE, England scarab@info.bt.co.uk www.labs.bt.com/people/mulhaug
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Abstract

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Technical hitches mar van Gelder's proposed map of the conceptual landscape, particularly with respect to descriptive levels and the trio of instantiation, realisation, and implementation. However, for all the formal quibbles, van Gelder is onto something important; the tension he notes between computationalism and a dynamical alternative threatens to transform the way we conduct cognitive science research.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press