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On the description of the prescription

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Commentary onJonathanBaron (1994) Nonconsequentialist decisions. BBS 17:1–42

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Ruth Beyth-Marom
Affiliation:
The Open University of Israel, Tel-Aviv, Israel, ruthbm@oumail.openu.ac.il

Abstract

Barons's target article approaches errors in decision-making by defining three kinds of models: normative, descriptive, and prescriptive. Baron's prescriptive model is at the center of this commentary. From a theoretical perspective, is Baron's prescriptive model a set of rules through which one can move from the descriptive to the normative? Or is it a practical goal one can achieve as opposed to a normative unachievable theoretical ideal? Delineating an efficient prescriptive account for decision making necessarily depends on a very specific normative model. However, Baron's normative consequentialism model is too general to enable adequate prescriptive accounts.

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Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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