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On the meaning and function of normative analysis: Conceptual blur in the rationality debate?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

David R. Mandel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, United Kingdom d.r.mandel@herts.ac.uk www.psy.herts.ac.uk/pub/d.r.mandel/
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Abstract

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The rationality debate centers on the meaning of deviations of decision makers' responses from the predictions/prescriptions of normative models. But for the debate to have significance, the meaning and functions of normative analysis must be clear. Presently, they are not, and the debate's persistence owes much to conceptual blur. An attempt is made here to clarify the concept of normative analysis.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press