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Paradoxical self-deception: Maybe not so paradoxical after all

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Stephanie L. Brown
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104 asslb@asuvm.inre.asu.edu.
Douglas T. Kenrick
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104 asslb@asuvm.inre.asu.edu.
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Abstract

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The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring “mental exotica.” We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press