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Phenomenal fallacies and conflations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Gilbert Harman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08455-1006. ghh@princeton.edu

Abstract

A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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