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Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and mixedstrategy evolutionary equilibria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Andrew M. Colman*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, England, amc@lelcester.ac.uk

Abstract

Mealey's interesting interpretation of sociopathy is based on an inappropriate two-person game model. A multiperson, compound game version of Chicken would be more suitable, because a population engaging in random pairwise interactions with that structure would evolve to an equilibrium in which a fixed proportion of strategic choices was exploitative, antisocial, and risky, as required by Mealey's interpretation.

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Type
Article Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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