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The problem of content in embodied memory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2004

Martin Kurthen ,
Thomas Grunwald ,
Christoph Helmstaedter  and
Christian E. Elger
Martin Kurthen*
Affiliation:
Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn, D-53105 Bonn, Germany http//www.uni-bonn.de/epileptologie/index.html
Thomas Grunwald
Affiliation:
Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn, D-53105 Bonn, Germany http//www.uni-bonn.de/epileptologie/index.html
Christoph Helmstaedter
Affiliation:
Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn, D-53105 Bonn, Germany http//www.uni-bonn.de/epileptologie/index.html
Christian E. Elger
Affiliation:
Department of Epileptology, University of Bonn, D-53105 Bonn, Germany http//www.uni-bonn.de/epileptologie/index.html
*
Martin.Kurthen@ukb.uni-bonn.de
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Abstract:

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An action-oriented theory of embodied memory is favorable for many reasons, but it will not provide a quick yet clean solution to the grounding problem in the way Glenberg (1997t) envisages. Although structural mapping via analogical representations may be an adequate mechanism of cognitive representation, it will not suffice to explain representation as such.

Information

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 5 , October 2003 , pp. 641 - 642
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

References

Note

Commentary on Arthur M. Glenberg (1997). What memory is for. BBS 20(1):1–19.