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Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

David R. Hemsley
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, England

Abstract

It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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