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Rational belief and social interaction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Daniel M. Hausman
Daniel M. Hausman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706-1474 http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hausman
*
dhausman@wisc.edu
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Abstract:

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Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003, pp. 163 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

References

Note

1. I do not, in fact, think that the standard theory of rationality is unproblematic (see e.g., my 1992 book, Chs. 2, 12, 13), but the difficulties I see are independent of those that Colman alleges.