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Real ascriptions of self-deception are fallible moral judgments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Edward A. Johnson
Edward A. Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, R3T 2N2, Canada ed_johnson@umanitoba.ca
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Abstract

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Mele's jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception preclude definitive ascriptions of self-deception in practice. Consequently, actual ascriptions of self-deception require large inferences and may frequently be in error. It is recommended that attention be directed toward actual practices of ascription to understand how children learn and adults dispense what is ultimately a moral judgment.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997, pp. 117 - 118
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press