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Reexamining visual cognition in human infants: On the necessity of representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Matthew Schlesinger
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901 matthews@siu.edu http://www.siu.edu/~matthew
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Abstract

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The sensorimotor account of vision proposed by O'Regan & Noë (O&N) challenges the classical view of visual cognition as a process of mentally representing the world. Many infant cognition researchers would probably disagree. I describe the surprising ability of young infants to represent and reason about the physical world, and ask how this capacity can be explained in non-representational terms. As a first step toward answering this question, I suggest that recent models of embodied cognition may help illustrate a way of escaping the representational trap.

Information

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press