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Resisting the tyranny of terminology: The general dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Terence Horgan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 thorgan@memphis.edu www.people.memphis.edu/~philos/horgan.tienson
John Tienson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152 thorgan@memphis.edu www.people.memphis.edu/~philos/horgan.tienson
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Abstract

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What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press