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Response to Lachman
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2004
Abstract
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Lachman claims that the Dynamical Hypothesis (DH) is “untenable.” His own position is a version of the “The DH is epistemological, not ontological,” objection to the target article, which is dealt with in section R2.3 of my original response (van Gelder 1998r). Additional objections are that the coverage of the hypothesis is “vast” and that the DH presupposes we have reached the end point of scientific theorizing. Indeed, the DH is very broad, but it does not presuppose that science has ended; that's why we call it a “hypothesis.”
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References
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