Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T02:14:06.054Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states

Review products

Commentary on SearleJohn R. (1990) Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science. BBS 13:585–642.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Norton Nelkin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148. nxnpl@uno.ed

Abstract

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'

Information

Type
Article Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable