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So what's a modeler to do?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2001

Esther Thelen,
Gregor Schöner,
Christian Scheier and
Linda B. Smith
Esther Thelen
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Program in Cognitive Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 thelene@indiana.edu smith4@indiana.edu www.php.indiana.~gormlef.edu
Gregor Schöner
Affiliation:
Centre de Recherche en Neurosciences Cognitives, C.N.R.S., Marseille, Cedex 20, France gregor@lnf.cnrs-mrs.fr
Christian Scheier
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 scheier@neuro.caltech.edu
Linda B. Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Program in Cognitive Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405 thelene@indiana.edu smith4@indiana.edu www.php.indiana.~gormlef.edu
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Abstract

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We argue that mentalistic constructs like the “object concept” are not substitutes for process explanations of cognition, and that it is impossible to prove the existence of such constructs with behavioral tasks. We defend the field theory as an appropriate level for modeling embodiment. Finally, we discuss the model'sbiological plausibility and its extensions to other tasks and other species.

Information

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , February 2001, pp. 70 - 80
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press