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Sorites paradox and conscious experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1999

Tamás Pólya and
László Tarnay
Tamás Pólya
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics, Janus Pannonius University, Pécs, Ifjúság út 6, H-7624, Hungary polya@btkstud.jpte.hu
László Tarnay
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Janus Pannonius University, Pécs, Ifjúság út 6, H-7624, Hungary tarnay@btk.jpte.hu
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Abstract

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The theory of consciousness proposed by O'Brien & Opie is open to the Sorites paradox, for it defines a consciousness system internally in terms of computationally relevant units which add up to consciousness only if sufficient in number. The Sorites effect applies on the assumed level of features.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , February 1999, pp. 165
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press