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Sub-optimal reasons for rejecting optimality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

David R. Shanks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT United Kingdom {d.shanks; d.lagnado}@ucl.ac.uk www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
David Lagnado
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT United Kingdom {d.shanks; d.lagnado}@ucl.ac.uk www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/david.shanks/Shanks.html
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Abstract

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Although we welcome Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group's shift of emphasis from “coherence” to “correspondence” criteria, their rejection of optimality in human decision making is premature: In many situations, experts can achieve near-optimal performance. Moreover, this competence does not require implausible computing power. The models Gigerenzer et al. evaluate fail to account for many of the most robust properties of human decision making, including examples of optimality.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press