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Teleological behaviorism and the intentional scheme

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Hugh Lacey
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081–1397.hlaceyl@cc.swarthmore.edu

Abstract

Teleological behaviorism, unlike Skinnerian behaviorism, recognizes that “mental terms’ are needed to account adequately for human behavior, but it rejects the essential role in behavioral explanations of the subjective perspective of the agent. I argue that teleological behaviorism fails because of this rejection.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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