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Theory of mind and other domain-specific hypotheses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2002

C. M. Heyes
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom c.heyes@ucl.ac.uk www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/celia.heyes/netintro.html/
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Abstract

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The commentators do not contest the target article's claim that there is no compelling evidence of theory of mind in primates, and recent empirical studies further support this view. If primates lack theory of mind, they may still have other behavior control mechanisms that are adaptive in complex social environments. The Somatic Marker Mechanism (SMM) is a candidate, but the SMM hypothesis postulates a much weaker effect of natural selection on social cognition than the theory of mind hypothesis (on inputs to cognitive mechanisms, not on the mechanisms themselves), and there is currently no evidence that it is specific to social stimuli or to primates. “Two Guesser” training would make the goggles test too chauvinistic, and in its current form the goggles problem could not be solved by physical matching because, while wearing goggles, an individual cannot see itself seeing.

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© 2001 Cambridge University Press