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Too much substance, not enough cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Vincent C. Müller
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Hamburg, D-22527 Hamburg, Germany vmueller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de kelter@informatik.uni-hamburg.de www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/grk/_eng.html
Stephanie Kelter
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Science, University of Hamburg, D-22527 Hamburg, Germany vmueller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de kelter@informatik.uni-hamburg.de www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/grk/_eng.html
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Abstract

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Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press