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towards an intuitionist account of moral development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

karen bartsch
Affiliation:
psychology department, university of wyoming, laramie, wy 82071-3415 bartsch@uwyo.edu narvik@uwyo.edu
jennifer cole wright
Affiliation:
psychology department, university of wyoming, laramie, wy 82071-3415 bartsch@uwyo.edu narvik@uwyo.edu
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Abstract

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sunstein's characterization of moral blunders jointly indicts an intuitive process and the structure of heuristics. but intuitions need not lead to error, and the problems with moral heuristics apply also to moral principles. accordingly, moral development may well involve more, rather than less, intuitive responsiveness. this suggests a novel trajectory for future research into the development of appropriate moral judgments.

Information

Type
open peer commentary
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press