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Unconscious motivation and phenomenal knowledge: Toward a comprehensive theory of implicit mental states

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Robert F. Bornstein
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325 bbornste@gettysburg.edu
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Abstract

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A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press