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Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

George N. Reeke Jr
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Biological Modelling, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY 10021. reeke@lobimo.rockefeller.edu

Abstract

Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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