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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

William G. Lycan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125

Abstract

Block contends that the concept of consciousness is a mongrel concept and that researchers go astray by conflating different notions of “consciousness.” This is certainly true. In fact, it is truer than Block acknowledges, because his own notion of P-consciousness runs together two, or arguably three, quite different and separable features of a sensory state.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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