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Why believe in beliefs?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2004

Mark H. Bickhard
Mark H. Bickhard*
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015 http://www.bickhard.ws/
*
mark@bickhard.name
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Abstract:

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A central pillar of Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) argument is Wittgenstein's later work on language. I suggest that this support is not as strong as might be wished, and offer an alternative approach to their conclusion that language learning, especially of folk psychology, involves a socially embedded constructivism.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , February 2004 , pp. 100 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

References

Notes

1. Normativity” is used here in the philosophical sense of involving the possibility of being bad or wrong. It includes such oppositions as functional-dysfunctional, true-false, correct-incorrect, and so on. Regarding Wittgenstein and language, see, for example, Glock (1996) and Shankar (1996).

2. It is an empiricist assumption that it must be so constituted. In contrast, any action-based model of representation forces learning to be a constructivist process: The environment cannot impress successful action systems into an otherwise passive mind (Bickhard & Campbell 1989).