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Why the dynamical hypothesis cannot qualify as a law of qualitative structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Nick Braisby,
Richard Cooper and
Bradley Franks
Nick Braisby
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, London Guildhall University, London E1 7NT braisby@lgu.ac.uk
Richard Cooper
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Birkbeck College, London WC1E 7HX r.cooper@psyc.bbk.ac.uk
Bradley Franks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, England b.frank@lse.ac.uk
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Abstract

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Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as a novel law of qualitative structure to compete with Newell and Simon's (1976) physical symbol systems hypothesis. Unlike Newell and Simon's hypothesis, the dynamical hypothesis fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. Furthermore, imprecision in the statement of the dynamical hypothesis renders it unfalsifiable.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 5 , October 1998, pp. 630 - 631
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press