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Words, concepts, and entities: With enemies like these, I don't need friends

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Ruth Garrett Millikan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-2054 millikan@uconnvm.uconn.edu
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Abstract

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A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the role of language in the conception of substances. Finally, I clarify exactly why I said that concepts of individuals, real kinds, and stuffs have “a common structure,”

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© 1998 Cambridge University Press