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Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2021

Stefanos A. Tsikas*
Affiliation:
Hannover Medical School, Hannover, Germany
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Abstract

With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

Information

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Table 1.The experimental design.

Figure 1

Table 2.Summary statistics of socioeconomic characteristics.

Figure 2

Table 3.Average contributions to the public good and nonparametric sample tests.

Figure 3

Figure 1.Contributions (tax payments) over time, in ECU.

Figure 4

Table 4.Frequency of full compliance in different round intervals.

Figure 5

Table 5.Good and bad example setters.

Figure 6

Table 6.Linear random and mixed-effects regressions.

Figure 7

Table 7.Behavior of shamed participants.

Figure 8

Table A1.Summary statistics for individual characteristics by treatment.

Figure 9

Table A2.Nonparametric Mann–Whitney U-tests for Table 4.

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