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How banks and other financial institutions think

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2018

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Abstract

Conventional diagnoses of the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis see it as “abnormal”, and then resort to explanations in terms of “irrational exuberance”, “animal spirits”, “herding behaviour” and so on. The prescription – “better regulation” – then follows automatically, as it has done after every such crisis, all the way back to tulipmania 400 years ago. But if there are different “seasons of risk”, and if financial sector actors are able to latch onto different risk-handling strategies, each appropriate to one of those seasons and inappropriate to the others, then we have a very different explanation: one in which, in contrast to both neoclassical and behavioural economics, rationality is no longer singular. This “anthropological” hypothesis has its roots in Mary Douglas’s book “How Institutions Think”, and the paper shows how it is well supported by historical evidence, agent-based modelling, and fieldwork among both financial sector firms and their regulators, as well as by parallels from ecology, organisation theory and evolutionary (i.e. Schumpeterian) economics.

Information

Type
Sessional meetings: papers and abstracts of discussions
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 2018
Figure 0

Figure 1Our basic hypothesis.

Figure 1

Figure 2The four seasons of risk.

Figure 2

Figure 3The fourfold typology of cultural biases/rationalities.

Figure 3

Figure 4The general theory of surprise.

Figure 4

Figure 5Firms by strategy: 50 period simulation.

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Figure 6Results of stay the course strategy.

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Figure 7Variation of results of success of adaptation.

Figure 7

Figure 8Distribution of risk preference for 200 individual survey respondents. MAX, maximiser; MGR, manager; PRAG, pragmatists; CONS, conservators.

Figure 8

Figure 9Average risk preference by type of position held. MGR, manager; PRAG, pragmatists; CONS, conservators.

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Figure 10Average risk preferences by company.

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Figure 11The fluidised regulator.