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The Electoral Implications of Coalition Policy Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2017

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Abstract

Coalition governance requires parties to come to collective policy decisions while simultaneously competing for votes. This reality has inspired a vibrant literature on coalition policy making, which is focused on legislative organization and behavior, though it is not clear how it affects the electorate. This article addresses this gap in the literature by examining how voters’ perceptions of compromise in coalition policy making affect their vote choices. Analyzing data from six parliamentary democracies where multiparty governance is the norm, it finds that voters punish parties they view as compromising. More specifically, voters are found to discount the policy accomplishments and policy promises of compromising parties, and that this tendency is more pronounced among previous incumbent cabinet supporters and the politically disinterested. These findings have important implications for the study of voting as well as coalition policy making.

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Articles
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© Cambridge University Press 2017 
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Table 1Descriptive Statistics

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Table 2Main Models: Effects of Perceived Compromise on Incumbent Support

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Fig. 1Exploring the competence and credibility hypotheses Note: the plot shows the marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation swing in Perceived Compromise on incumbent support over the range of economic performance and ideological distance between voters and parties. The case is a two-party contest pitting one incumbent party against one opposition party. In the left pane ideological proximity is held constant at the sample mean and economic performance is varied; in the right pane economic performance is held constant at the sample mean and ideological distance is varied. The observed values of economic performance and distance are given by the background histogram.

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Fig. 2The predicted change in incumbent vote share resulting from a one-standard-deviation swing in Perceived Compromise

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Table 3Unpacking the predicted effects of Perceived Compromise

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