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Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2018

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Abstract

Democratic rule is maintained so long as all relevant actors in the political system comply with the institutional rules of the game – democratic institutions must be self-enforcing. We examine the role of transparency in supporting a democratic equilibrium. Transparency improves the functioning of elections: in transparent polities, elections more effectively resolve adverse selection problems between the public and their rulers. Transparency increases popular satisfaction with democracy and inhibits challenges to the democratic order. We provide a game-theoretic model, test these claims, and find they enjoy empirical support. Transparency is associated with a reduction in both the probability of democratic collapse and of the irregular removal of democratic leaders. Transparency stabilizes democratic rule.

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Articles
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© Cambridge University Press 2018 
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Table 1Summary Statistics

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Table 2Transparency and the Hazard of Democratic Collapse

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Fig. 1Democracy hazard rates as a function of transparency and growth

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Table 3Transparency and Irregular Leader Removal

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Table 4Transparency and Regular Leader Removal

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Table 5Estimates Marginal Effects of a One Standard Deviation Increase in Growth

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