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Trust, Accountability, and Sales Agents’ Dueling Loyalties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Abstract

This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1996

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