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The Case for Leverage-Based Corporate Human Rights Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Stepan Wood*
Affiliation:
York University
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Abstract:

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Should companies’ human rights responsibilities arise, in part, from their “leverage”—their ability to influence others’ actions through their relationships? Special Representative John Ruggie rejected this proposition in the United Nations Framework for business and human rights. I argue that leverage is a source of responsibility where there is a morally significant connection between the company and a rights-holder or rights-violator, the company is able to make a contribution to ameliorating the situation, it can do so at modest cost, and the threat to human rights is substantial. In such circumstances companies have a responsibility to exercise leverage even though they did nothing to contribute to the situation. Such responsibility is qualified, not categorical; graduated, not binary; context-specific; practicable; consistent with the social role of business; and not merely a negative responsibility to avoid harm but a positive responsibility to do good.

Information

Type
Special Issue: Human Rights and Business
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2012