Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T03:25:02.676Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 1934–1940

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Michael R. Adamson
Affiliation:
MICHAEL R. ADAMSON is a visiting scholar in the Office for History of Science and Technology at the University of California, Berkeley.

Extract

This article explores the contentious U.S. State Department–Foreign Bondholders Protective Council relationship in the context of interwar foreign economic policy and bureaucratic competition. U.S. officials created the council in 1933 to represent the interests of U.S. investors in the settlement of the numerous dollar bond issues that had gone into default. The article shows why the council failed to perform as U.S. officials expected and outlines the process by which they increasingly interposed themselves in debt negotiations. In doing so, it considers the limitations of using private organizations to accomplish the objectives of public policy.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable