Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2013
“Corporate reputation” is a term that on the face of it hardly needs explanation. Historians have long used it in an unproblematic fashion to refer to the way a firm is perceived by others. Yet as with many such terms, corporate reputation can be theorized or at least formally defined. Scholars in the fields of marketing and organization increasingly are doing both; since the 1980s they have attempted to distinguish reputation from the related constructs of image, identity, status, legitimacy, celebrity, and brand equity. The project is ongoing, and a strong consensus has not yet been reached on how to define corporate reputation. Charles Fombrun, whose definitions have been perhaps the most widely used, suggests the following: “a collective assessment of a company's attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference group of companies with which the company competes for resources.” Fombrun's definition contains three core ideas: firms have multiple reputations, depending on which stakeholders are being considered; corporate reputation is a comparative construct, because a firm is always judged in relation to something else—in this case, the firm's competitors; and firms' reputations are a source of competitive advantage or disadvantage.
Historians, who for valid intellectual reasons rarely attempt the formal definition of terms, have not participated in the theorizing of corporate reputation. Yet the peculiar skills of historians are much needed; for if the study of corporate reputation has underemphasized the role of institutional phenomena such as rules, norms, processes, and structures, it has all but ignored historical context and historical processes.
1 For example, Brown, Tom J.et al., “Identity, Intended Image, Construed Image, and Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Framework and Suggested Terminology,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 34, no. 2 (2006): 99–106.
2 Fombrun, Charles J., “The Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences,” Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation, ed. Barnett, Michael L. and Pollock, Timothy G. (Oxford, 2012), 100.
3 Brammer, Stephen and Jackson, Gregory, “How Regulatory Institutions Influence Corporate Reputations: A Cross-Country Comparative Approach,” Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation, ed. Barnett, Michael L. and Pollock, Timothy G. (Oxford, 2012), 297–319.
4 McKenna, Christopher D. and Olegario, Rowena, “Reputation and Regulation in Historical Perspective,” Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation, ed. Barnett, Michael L. and Pollock, Timothy G. (Oxford, 2012), 260–77.
5 See for example James, Harold, Family Capitalism: Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
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7 Perkins, Edwin J., Financing Anglo-American Trade: The House of Brown, 1800–1880 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).
8 Chernow, Ron, The Death of the Banker: The Decline and Fall of the Great Financial Dynasties and the Triumph of the Small Investor (New York, 1997).
9 Morrison, Alan D. and Wilhelm, William J. Jr., Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law (Oxford, 2007).
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11 Baker, George P. and Smith, George David, The New Financial Capitalists: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts and the Creation of Corporate Value (Cambridge, U.K., 1998).
12 This view was theorized most effectively by sociologist Granovetter, Mark, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology 91 (11 1985): 481–510.
13 Lamoreaux, Naomi, Raff, Daniel M. G., and Temin, Peter, “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History,” NBER Working Paper no. 9029, 06 2002, 58. Available online: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9029.
14 Richman, Barak D., “Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering,” Columbia Law Review 104, no. 1 (2004): 2328–67; Bernstein, Lisa, “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” Journal of Legal Studies 21, no. 1 (1992): 115–57; and “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,” Michigan Law Review 99, no. 7 (2001): 1724–90.
15 Greif, Avner, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,” Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989): 857–82. See also Greif, , Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge, U.K., 2006).
16 Finn, Margot, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914 (Cambridge, U.K., 2003); Olegario, Rowena, A Culture of Credit: Embedding Trust and Transparency in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 2006). See also Maurer, Noel and Sharma, Tridib, “Enforcing Property Rights through Reputation: Groups in Mexico's Early Industrialization, 1878–1913,” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (12 2001): 950–73.
17 Even into the late twentieth century, the U.S. diamond industry relied heavily on such a body (the bourse) to enforce the extralegal contracts that are the norm for that closed, secretive industry. Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System.” See also Lurie, Jonathan, The Chicago Board of Trade, 1859–1905: The Dynamics of Self-regulation (Champaign, Ill., 1979).
18 Najemy, John M., “Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate Failure of Corporate Politics,” American Historical Review 84, no. 1 (1979): 53–71.
19 Greif, Avner, Milgrom, Paul, and Weingast, Barry R., “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 4 (1994): 745–76.
20 Smith, David Kammerling, “Learning Politics: The Nîmes Hosiery Guild and the Statutes Controversy of 1706–1712,” French Historical Studies 22, no. 4 (1999): 493–533.
21 Hannah, Leslie, “Pioneering Modern Corporate Governance: A View from London in 1900,” Enterprise & Society 8 (2007): 680.
22 See, for example, Deephouse, David L. and Carter, Suzanne M., “An Examination of Differences between Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation,” Journal of Management Studies 42, no. 2 (2005): 329–60.
23 Micklethwait, John and Wooldridge, Adrian, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea (New York, 2005, 1st ed. 2003); Lipartito, Kenneth and Sicilia, David B., eds., Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture (Oxford, 2004).
24 Hurst, James W., The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation (Charlottesville, Va., 1969).
25 Taylor, James, “Company Fraud in Victorian Britain: The Royal British Bank Scandal of 1856,” English Historical Review 122, no. 497 (2007): 700–24.
26 Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation.
27 Galambos, Louis, The Public Image of Big Business in America, 1880–1940 (Baltimore, 1975).
28 Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Keller, Morton, The Life Insurance Enterprise: A Study in the Limits of Corporate Power (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); Keller, Morton, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
29 See McCraw, Thomas K., Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). For specific studies of pharmaceuticals, banking, and aviation, see Carpenter, Daniel, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton, 2010); Calomiris, Charles W., U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, U.K., 2000); Jones, Geoffrey, British Multinational Banking, 1830–1990 (Oxford, 1993); Vietor, Richard H. K., Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
30 See, for example, Rindova, Violina P. and Fombrun, Charles J., “Constructing Competitive Advantage: The Role of Firm-Constituent Interactions,” Strategic Management Journal 20, no. 8 (1999): 691–710.
31 Ewen, Stuart, PR! A Social History of Spin (New York, 1996); Miller, David and Dinan, William, A Century of Spin: How Public Relations Became the Cutting Edge of Corporate Power (London, 2008); Laird, Pamela Walker, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore, 1998).
32 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton, 2007); McKenna, Christopher, The World's Newest Profession: Management Consulting in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, U.K., 2006).
33 Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands.