¹ 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6.

² See the interesting speech by MrPickthorn, K. W. M., M.P., on the second reading of the Public Order Bill, reported in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1936, vol. 317, col. 1379.Google Scholar

³ Law of the Constitution, 8th ed., chap. vii.

⁴ At p. 267.

⁵ (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 308.

⁶ The law relating to meetings held on private premises is discussed in 1936, 6 Cambridge Law Journal 22.

⁷ Harrison v. Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 Q. B. 142, per Lopes L.J. at p. 154. Lord Esher M.R. said at p. 146: ‘So, if a man goes on to part of a highway, the soil of which belongs to the owner of the adjoining land, not for the purpose of using such part of the highway as a highway, but only for some other purpose, “lawful or unlawful”—to use the words of Crompton, J., in the same case (R. v. Pratt, 4 E. & B. 860)—he is in so doing committing a trespass against the owner of the soil.’

⁸ [1900] 1 Q. B. 752.

⁹ At p. 756.

¹⁰ 38 & 39 Viet. c. 55. County roads are vested in county councils by the Local Government Act, 1855, 8. 11, and the Local Government Act, 1920, s. 29.

¹¹ Sir W. E. Hart and W. O. Hart, Au Introduction to the Law of Local Government and Administration, p. 512.

¹² [1896] A. C. 434, 137.

¹³ See Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods [1899] 2 Ch. 705.

¹⁴ Halsbury, vol. 27-‘Street and Aerial Traffic’ at p. 281.

¹⁵ [1899] 2 Ch. 705.

¹⁶ [1893] 1 Q. B. 142.

¹⁷ 48 & 49 Viet. c. 75.

¹⁸ Burden v. Rigler [1911] 1 K. B. 337.

¹⁹ R. v. Bartholomew [1908] 1 K. B. 554, 561.

²⁰ Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, 8th ed. bk. 1, chap. 32.

²¹ Halsbury, Hailsham ed. vol. xvi, Highways, p. 355: ‘It is no defence to show that … though a part of the highway actually used by passengers is obstructed, sufficient available space is left.’

²² In Gill v. Carson and Nield [1917] 2 K. B. 674, –677 Viscount Reading C.J. said: ‘In my judgment it is not necessary to prove that a person has been actually obstructed. It is quite sufficient to prove circumstances from which the justices can conclude that in the ordinary course persons may be obstructed, and that the actual use of the road was calculated to obstruct even though no person was proved to have been obstructed.’

²³ R. v. Train (1862) 2 B. & S. 640.

²⁴ Stone, Justices' Manual, 66th ed. 1934, p. 1598.

²⁵ [1902] 1 K. B. 167.

²⁶ (1888) 16 Cox C. C. 51.

²⁷ (1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 118.

²⁸ (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 155, 157.

²⁹ 16 Cox C. C. 420.

³⁰ (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 191.

³¹ 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47.

³² 16 Cox at p. 429. He also said: ‘So far as I know the law of England, the use of public thoroughfares is for people to pass and repass along them. That is the purpose for which they are, as we say, dedicated by the owner of them to the use of the public, and they are not dedicated to the public use for any other purpose.’

³³ 21 Q. B. D. at p. 197. He added on p. 198: ‘[The arguments] have not only failed to convince us that there is any right to hold public meetings in Trafalgar Square, but have gone far to establish that the Commissioners of Works have a right to say whether or not it shall be so used.’

³⁴ [1911] 1 K. B. 337.

³⁵ 8 Edw. 7, c. 66.

³⁶ [1936] 1 K. B. 218.

³⁷ 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112.

³⁸ 48 & 49 Vict. c. 75.

³⁹ See on this point letters by the Hon. Cyril Asquith, K.C., in The Times newspaper, Nov. 2 and 14, 1936.

⁴⁰ In Lyons, Sons & Co. v, Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch. at 651 Phillimore L.J. said: ‘They are not entitled, using the highway to stop on the highway and stand still more than a reasonable time. It is an obstruction of the highway for a person to stand in the highway for more than a reasonable time, and the police, at any rate in the metropolis, have a power to move such people on.’

⁴¹ Pp. 498, 499.

⁴² (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 308.

⁴³ See Duncan v. Jones [1986] 1 K: B. at p. 222.

⁴⁴ (1884) 51 L. T. 304.

⁴⁵ Att. Gen. v. Brighton and Hove Co-operative Supply Association [1900] 1 Ch. 276, 281. Cf. Jessel M.R. in Original Hartlepool Collieries Co. v. Gibb (1877) 5 Ch. D. 713, 724: ‘You have no right to obstruct a public highway; whether it is useful to yourself or not, that is quite immaterial.’

⁴⁶ [1900] 1 Ch. at p. 282.

⁴⁷ Homer v. Cadman, 16 Cox C. C. 51.

⁴⁸ Inchbald v. Robinson (1868–9) 4 Ch. 388.

⁴⁹ [1903] 2 I. R. 82.

⁵⁰ At p. 87.

⁵¹ At p. 88.

⁵² At p. 90.

⁵³ At p. 90.

⁵⁴ 7 T. L. R. 135, 136.

⁵⁵ R. v. Carlisle, 6 Car. & P. 636.

⁵⁶ In Halsbury: Hailsham ed. vol. xvi, p. 362—‘Highways’—it is said that it is a nuisance, ‘to organise or take part in a procession or meeting which naturally results in an obstruction and is an unreasonable use of the highway.’ Here processions and meetings are treated as if they were covered by the same rules, but, as we have suggested, there is a radical difference between them. A reasonable procession is not a nuisance even though it may naturally result in an obstruction, while a meeting which causes an appreciable obstruction is a nuisance, however reasonable it may be from other points of view.