¹ “I have frequently stated that I never did understand with precision what was a conversion”: Bramwell, L.J. in Hiorl v. L & NWR (1879) 4 Ex.D. 188, 194.Google Scholar

² Excluding exemplary damages, that is, and counting “loss” in the widest sense, as including nonpecuniary items like distress and loss of reputation. It is true that trespass is actionable per se but in the absence of aggravating factors damages are likely to be low or nominal.

³ Hence, perhaps, explaining why there seems no reported instance of a claim for contribution between two serial converters of the same property under section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978; although they are arguably concurrent tortfeasors (see Williams, Glanville, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951), p. 19), their liability is not dependent on loss, and hence they are not liable “in respect of the same damage” within the section. Sed quaere how far this goes: could this reasoning apply to liability for consequential damage?Google Scholar

⁴ Though the plaintiff may recover special damages in respect of actual loss suffered over and above that represented by the value of the goods.

⁵ See now Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s. 5, largely re-enacting the common law. On the measure of damages in conversion generally, see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 16th ed. (1989), §§22–88Google Scholaret seq.; McGregor on Damages, 15th ed. (1988), §1298el seq.Google Scholar

⁶ Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s. 11(1) (subject to the limited exception introduced by the Banking Act 1979, s. 47). The position at common law was unclear; see generally Part III, below.

⁷ E.g. in the rule that anyone who deals with someone else's goods is liable in full, whether or not his act in fact worsened the owner's position. See below, Part II.

⁸ “I cannot think that the law would really lay down anything so ridiculous as that a man should be compensated whether he suffered damages or not”: Bowen, L.J. in Williams v. Peel River Co. (1886) 55 L.T. 689, 692–3Google Scholar (a detinue case, but the principle is the same); see too Wickham Holdings v. Brooke House Motors [1967] 1 W.L.R. 295, 300Google Scholar (Lord Denning M.R.), 302 (Danckwerts L.J.); Brandeis Goldschmidt v. Western Transport (1981) Q.B. 864, 870 (Brandon L.J)Google Scholar; Butler v. Egg Mktg. Bd. [1966] A.L.R. 1025, 1026–7 (Taylor, and Owen, JJ.)Google Scholar. More recently, see the unreported C.A. decision in Saleh Farid v. Theodorou, 30 Jan 1992Google Scholar, where similar disquiet was expressed at the claim for an award of more than the plaintiffs actual proved loss.

⁹ There are at least two further controversial cases of damages in conversion, which are not dealt with in this article. One is the so-called “ius tertii” rule, allowing a plaintiff on occasion to recover full damages in respect of conversion of property of which he is not the owner; the other is the rule in Strand Electric v. Brisford Entertainments [1952] 2 Q.B. 246Google Scholar, allowing recovery of hire charges by a plaintiff who would not in fact have hired out the goods concerned. The former rule is not now very important, having been largely abrogated by section 8 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. The latter is really an artificial means of reckoning consequential loss, rather than an aspect of any conventional measure of damages in conversion; and in any case it provides scope for a separate article in its own right.

¹⁰ See its 18th Report (1971 Cmnd 4774), §12.

¹¹ This analysis is slightly adapted from that in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 16th ed., §§22–10 et seq.Google Scholar

¹² Strictly speaking, a thing which P has an immediate right to possess, whether or not he is in fact the owner. But it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the question of title to sue in conversion, or the related problem of the ius tertii.

¹³ As, e.g., where he sells in market overt, since here a mere agreement suffices to give good title, and hence divest the previous owner's interest for good: R. v. Wheeler (1990) 92 Cr.App.R. 279.Google Scholar

¹⁴ This is a statutory form of conversion. Introduced by section 2(2) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, it replaces a similar liability in detinue, which would otherwise have disappeared when that tort was abolished by section 2(1) of the same Act.

¹⁵ E.g. being a bailee, he holds on to the goods for too long because he wrongfully claims a lien on them: as in Finlayson v. Taylor, The Times 14 April 1983.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Clerk, & Lindsell, , Torts, 16th ed., § 22–67Google Scholaret seq. There are a few pragmatic exceptions: e.g. a bailee is not generally liable if he innocently returns goods to his bailor, and under section 234 of the Insolvency Act 1986 a liquidator receives some statutory protection in respect of dealings with what seems to be the company's property. But these remain exceptional cases.

¹⁷ See the Limitation Act 1980, s. 1(3), which in the case of successive conversions of the same property bars the right to sue for any conversion taking place more than six years after the first conversion of the property concerned.

¹⁸ E.g. if P's goods are bought and then sold by D, and have in the meantime gone up or down in value, P may rely on either the purchase or the sale. Normally he will choose the conversion at which the value was highest, since prima facie that will give him the highest measure of damages.

¹⁹ The time at which the value is taken can be problematical, but prima facie it is the time of judgment. This is subject to two qualifications. First, where it is shown that P would have disposed of the chattel between the time he demanded it and the time of judgment, its value at that time is taken; see IBL Ltd. v. Coussens [1991] 2 All E.R. 133. Secondly, if P merely claims damages, then the value at the time of refusal is taken: ibid. This latter distinction looks odd, but may be justified on the basis that by abandoning any claim to recover the chattel in specie P is showing that he is happy to disregard any subsequent rise in value.

²⁰ For the history, see Holdsworth, History of English Law (1923–1966) ii. p. 350et seq.; vii. p. 402et seq.Google Scholar

²¹ See Weir, Casebook on Tort, 6th ed. (1988), p.419 et seq. CfSamuels, J.Google Scholar in Wilton v. Commonwealth Trading Bank [1973] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 644, 666Google Scholar: “It may be that English law, having no real action for chattels, is forced to distort the law of torts to enable an owner to assert his ownership.”

²² See, e.g., Scots law, where interference with goods is dealt with through the delict of spuilzie. but their recovery effected by the non-delictual action of restitution. See generally Walker, , Principles of Scottish Private Law, 4th ed. (1989), vol. IV, p. 286Google Scholaret seq. It is also worth noting that even in English law the action for the recovery of land, though it started out (in the form of the action of “ejectment”) as an offshoot of the law of trespass, is now regarded as conceptually distinct from the law of tort.

²³ Weir, , Casebook on Tort, 6th ed. (1988), p. 419Google Scholaret seq. On the distinction between the common law and civil law treatment of interference with personal property, see Samuel, G. (1982) 31 I.C.L.Q. 357.Google Scholar

²⁴ It might be argued that this measure was equally appropriate to conversion type (ii); surely a person should not be allowed to take another's thing without paying its full value? But this argument assumes that the defendant still has the thing concerned, in which case he will be liable under (i) anyway. If he does not still have it, the argument in favour of liability for its value is a good deal weaker.

²⁵ Note that detinue, the tort which conversion largely superseded and which also lay for the value of the goods, was limited to a defendant in possession (with one exception in the case of a bailee who had lost the goods and who was, as it were, estopped from denying that he could return them). Detinue was, of course, abolished by section 2 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977.

²⁶ See Fleming on Torts, 7th ed. (1987), p. 52Google Scholar, following the American authorities cited in Prosser (1957) 52 Cornell, L.O.168, 174Google Scholar; for an English authority, cf. Sanderson v. Marsden (1922) 10 Lloyd's List L.R. 467.Google Scholar

²⁷ The reason for this scepticism is that conversion of this sort will very rarely exist in isolation, and the tortfeasor D will normally commit subsequent conversions which P will equally be able to rely on; e.g. by disposing of the goods, or destroying them, or refusing to return them on demand. True, this will not be so where D, having abstracted the goods, loses them; but even there, P should be able to recover his loss, if any, in trespass to goods (or, if he was not in possession at the time, by suing for damage to his reversion).

²⁸ The question of t h e dishonest converter is discussed below in Part III. Suffice it to say at this stage that one of the problems of conversion damages is that they draw no distinction between innocent tortfeasors and others.

²⁹ We assume, for obvious reasons, that D has no lien or other justification for acting as he does.

³⁰ As indeed he nearly always has in cases of taking. The only time when he does not is where, at the time of the taking, he was neither in possession of the goods, nor a bailor at will of them. See Ward v. Macauley (1791) 4 T.R. 489, 490; Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 16th ed., § 22–120. And even here he may well have an action on the case for damage to the reversion, if and to the extent that he can prove actual loss: ibid., § 22–125.

³¹ The fact that damages are available in trespass for non-pecuniary loss, E.g. distress, does not alter this. Such damages do reflect a loss to the plaintiff, albeit one that cannot be measured in money. And in any case it seems they are available in conversion in suitable cases: see e.g. Grahamv. Voigr (1989) 89 A.L.R. 11 (sentimental damages for loss of stamp collection).Google Scholar

³² See e.g. Tear v. Freebody (1858) C.B.(N.S.)228,Google Scholar where P's successful claim of a conversion by D seems to have been based on a desire to obtain the higher measure of damages. Cases limiting the bounds of conversion, such as Fouldes v. Willoughby (1841) 8 M. & W. 540Google Scholar and Sanderson v. Marsden (1922) 10 Lloyd's List L.R. 467, may well have been motivated as much as anything by a desire to limit the effect of this anomaly, and to prevent unmeritorious “value claims”.Google Scholar

³³ As happened, in a slightly different context, in Williams v. Archer (1847) 5 CB 318.Google Scholar (It might be thought that the decision in Sanderson v. Marsden (1922) 10 Lloyd's List L.R. 467 militated against this conclusion; but, it is submitted, this case turned on the finding that, given the special practice at the docks, no conversion had taken place.)Google Scholar

³⁴ It might be thought that this conclusion was invalidated by Brandeis Goldschmidt v. Western Transport [1981] OB. 864Google Scholar; but since the decision in BBMB v. Eda Holdings Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409 this seems not to be the case.Google Scholar

³⁵ It is clear that P is entitled to do this where the property has depreciated in value: Fisher v. Prince (1763) 3 Burr. 1363, 1364; Tucker v. Wright (1826) 3 Bing 601, 602. To be fair, the position is different where there has been no deterioration: ibid. (though why this should make any difference is not entirely clear).

³⁶ True, it might be argued that it was unfair to make P take back depreciated goods. But why? If D negligently damages P's goods, P has to make do with the damaged goods plus damages: why not apply the same rule to a conversion plaintiff as well?

³⁷ It should be remembered that we are here assuming that the defendant no longer has the goods. If he is still in possession of them, then the plaintiff will almost certainly rely on conversion by refusal to return under Head (i) above, and so the question of damages under Head (iii) will not arise.

³⁸ Which is itself doubtful. If I buy jewellery from a thief and it is later stolen from me, it is—to say the least—harsh for the law to require me (as at present it does) to account for its value over again to the true owner.

³⁹ Subject, as before, to possible qualification in t he case of the defendant who is actually dishonest.

⁴⁰ E.g. sale in market overt, or under the provisions of section 2 of the Factors Act 1889.

⁴¹ Cf. the cases interpreting sections 6 and 7 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which hold that goods which are stolen have effectively “perished” within the meaning of those provisions, despite the fact that they may still exist and be theoretically recoverable by the seller or buyer, as the case may be: e.g. Barrow Lane & Ballard v. Phillip Phillips [1929] 1 K.B. 574.Google Scholar The point is perceptively discussed in Atiyah, , Sale of Goods, 8th ed., at pp. 81et seq.Google Scholar

⁴² Indeed, arguably it should make no difference even if X is traceable. If one regards the matter as one of mitigation of damage—a perfectly plausible analysis—it might well be unreasonable to expect P to engage in the hazards of suing X to recover his property. (The question of mitigation of loss in connection with conversion is dealt with in greater detail below.)

⁴³ For the dishonest converter, see Part III, below.

⁴⁴ Which is open to doubt, pace the Law Reform Committee who, in their 18th Report (1971 Cmnd 4774, § 14), were concerned that any relaxation of the rule might encourage dishonesty. There is, as far as the writer knows, no evidence that such dishonesty is commoner in Scotland, where the innocent ex-possessor of goods has never been under any liability at all: see, e.g., N. W. Securities v. Barrhead Coachworks 1976 S.C. 68.Google Scholar It is also worth noting that the innocent recipient of trust property who is no longer in possession is only liable if dishonest or, possibly, if negligent: see, e.g., International Sales and Agencies Ltd. v. Marcus [1982] 3 All E.R. 551Google Scholar and Re Montagu [1987] Ch. 264. Full discussion of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this article.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Quaere whether a right to contribution arises between Dl, D2, etc? See note 3 above.

⁴⁶ This causation anomaly stands out more starkly if one compares the position in negligence. If goods are damaged by a scries of tortfeasors Dl, D2, etc., P can recover against each only to the extent that he can show that the damage was made worse by his action; Performance Cars v. Abraham [1962] 1 Q.B. 33.Google Scholar It seems odd that where P's goods remain entire and her loss is only economic, she not only recovers on a basis of strict liability, but gets their full value as well. See too the discussion of the position where the plaintiff is suing for damage to the reversion, discussed by the East African Court of Appeal in Mukibi v. Bhavsar [1967] E.A. 473.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Solloway v. McLaughlin [1938] A.C. 247.Google Scholar In fact the defendant there was clearly dishonest, which no doubt helped to salve Lord Atkin's conscience at holding him liable (see at 259); however, one of the problems with the present measure of damages in conversion (discussed below) is its failure to distinguish honest and dishonest wrongdoers. Solloway's case was recently confirmed as correct by the Privy Council in BBMB Finance Ltd. v. Eda Holdings Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Pace McGregor, Damages, 15th ed. §1311, suggesting that the element of enrichment of itself justifies making D liable.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Brandeis Goldschmidt v. Western Transport [1981] Q.B. 864.Google Scholar The distinction between the two cases was confirmed in BBMB Finance Ltd. v. Eda Holdings Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Subject to particular problems, such as the plaintiff with limited title, which are not dealt with at this point.

⁵¹ [1981] Q.B. 864.Google Scholar

⁵² Strictly speaking Brandeis Goldschmidt was a detinue case, since proceedings were issued before the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 came into force. Bui it is inconceivable that a similar rule would not apply in conversion; as indeed was assumed in BBMB Finance Ltd. v. Eda Holdings Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409, where, although the cause of action was conversion, the Privy Council were at pains to distinguish Brandeis Goldschmidt.Google Scholar

⁵³ E.g. where a bailee innocently returns goods to his bailor who did not own them (Hollins v. Fowler (1874–1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 757, 766Google Scholarel seq.), or where a company liquidator inadvertently deals with property not belonging to the company (Insolvency Act 1986, s. 234). Sec generally Clerk & Lindsell, 16th ed., §22–67et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ I.e. a possessor must give up goods to the true owner however innocently he came by them.

⁵⁵ In this connection, note the greater willingness of American courts to hold that D's innocence may prevent him being guilty of conversion at all: see generally Prosscr, Torts, 4th ed., p. 83 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See McGregor, , Damages, 15th ed., §1311Google Scholar, stressing this point in connection with Solloway v. McLaughlin “1938” AC. 247.Google Scholar (In this connection, it is interesting to note that the two cases establishing this extended liability, Solloway v. McLaughlin and BBMB Finance Ltd. v. Eda Holdings Lid. “1990” 1 W.L.R. 409, have concerned clearly fraudulent defendants.)Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. s. 11(1).

⁵⁸ And even here, it is worth bearing in mind that contributory negligence may apply to certain sorts of deliberate wrongdoing: e.g. Murphy v. Culhane “1977” Q.B. 94, 98, per Lord Denning M.R. (assault).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ In Lloyds Bank v. Savory [1933] A.C. 201, 229Google Scholar, a case decided before the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, Lord Wright expressed the view that contributory negligence was no defence to an action in conversion at common law. By contrast, in Lumsden & Co. v. Trustee Savings Bank “1971” 1 Lloyd's, Google Scholar Rep. 114, Lord Donaldson M.R. held that conversion was, on principle, subject to the provisions of the 1945 Act, and thus inferentially that contributory negligence had been a defence at common law. See too Souhrada v. Bank of N.S.W. “1976” 2 Lloyd's Rep. 444.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Subject, now, to one exception in the case of conversion of cheques by banks: Banking Act 1979, s. 47. Cheques, in any case, arc a very peculiar form of property; having no intrinsic value as pieces of paper, it is only by a fiction that they arc regarded as being “worth” their face value. It is therefore understandable that it should be thought that actions for conversion of a cheque should not be subject to the same rules as actions for misdealings with orthodox property.

⁶¹ Cf. Law Reform C'tee, 12th Report (1966 Cmnd 2958), §9.

⁶² Though even here it is hard to find any justification for disregarding contributory negligence in the case of special damage suffered by the plaintiff over and above the conventional measure: see below.

⁶³ Law Reform C'tee, 12th Report (1966 Cmnd 2958); cf. Ingram v. Little “1961” 1 O B . 31, 73–74, per Devlin L.J.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Illustrative cases include Moorgale Mercantile v. Twitchings “1977” AC. 890Google Scholar and Debs v. Sibec Developments Ltd., The Times 19 05 1989.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Unless the trespass is intentional: if it is, section 11(1) of the 1977 Act equally disallows contributory negligence as a defence.

⁶⁶ Now by virtue of section 2(2) of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. This liability had previously lain in detinue; it was salvaged and transferred to conversion when the same Act abolished detinue.

⁶⁷ It seems clear that this action is subject to the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: see Palmer. Bailment, 2nd ed., pp. 69et seq.,Google Scholar and cf. Walker v. Watson ]1974[ 2 N.Z.L.R. 175.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For an ingenious argument of how a court might avoid this conclusion, see Palmer, Bailment, 2nd ed., pp. 226–227. But even Professor Palmer admits that this would take an “ambitious” court.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ It is certainly open to a defendant to plead that consequential loss did not flow from the conversion but from the intervening act of a third party: see, e.g., Chubb Cash v. Crilley [1983] 1 W.L.R. 599. It would seem to follow that the same result would apply where the loss flowed from the plaintiff's own failure to take reasonable steps to protect his interests.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ E.g. where Dl converts P's goods and sells them to D2, who remains in possession, and Dl is known to P and is likely to be able to meet any judgment against him.

⁷¹ In Morris v. Robinson (1824) 3 B. & C. 196, 205–206, Bayley, and Holroyd, J.J.Google Scholar apparently thought that a conversion plaintiff might be obliged to mitigate his loss by proceeding against a third party. But it now seems accepted that any such view is heretical; see International Factors Ltd. v. Rodriguez [1979] OB. 351, 359, firmly denying any such duty.Google Scholar

⁷² Quaere as to the position where they have not depreciated. Sec note 73, below.

⁷³ SeeFisher v. Prince (1763) 3 Burr. 1363Google Scholar; Tucker v. Wright (1826) 3 Bing 601.Google Scholar To be fair, the position is different where there has been no deterioration: ibid, (though why this should make any difference is not clear).

⁷⁴ [1948] 2 K.B. 23.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Cf.. in another context, London & South of England Building Society v. Stone [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1242Google Scholar (where building society sues surveyor for over-valuing its security, it is not reasonable to expect it lo mitigate its loss by proceeding against the borrower on his personal covenant to repay).

⁷⁶ E.g. under section 2(1) of the Factors Act 1889.

⁷⁷ See The Charlotte [1908) P. 206Google Scholar; The Sanix Ace [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465 (both in fact negligence cases; but the principle must be applicable a fortiori to conversion).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See Mulliner v. Florence (1878) 3 O.B.D. 484, 491Google Scholar, per Bramwcll, L.J.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Mulliner v. Florence, above; see too Edmondson v. Nuttall (1864) 17 C.B. (N.S.) 280 (in reckoning damages for conversion, the court will disregard any liability of the goods converted to execution in respect of a debt owed to the defendant).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Chinery v. Viall (1860) 5 H. & N. 288Google Scholar; Butler v. Egg Marketing Board [1966] A.L.R. 1025.Google ScholarCf. Dean v. Thomas [1981] Od.R. 62 (van repaired by bailee later lost in fire owing to bailee's default).Google Scholar

⁸¹ Brierly v. Kendall (1852) 19 Q.B. 937Google Scholar; Toms v. Wilson (1863) 4 B. & S. 455Google Scholar; Moore v. Shelley (1863) 8 App.Cas. 285.Google Scholar

⁸² [1967] W.L.R. 295.Google Scholar See too Belsize v. Cox [1914] 1 KB. 244Google Scholar and Belvoir Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stapleton [1971] 1 Q.B. 210.Google Scholar

⁸³ What about the argument that X's sale of the car destroyed any interest he might have had in it as a bailee, on the basis of Cooper v. Willomatt (1845) 1 C.B. 672Google Scholar? Presumably the answer is by analogy to Donald v. Suckling (1866) L.R. 1 OB. 585; if wrongful sale by a pledgee leaves the pledge effective, sale by a hire purchaser should have the same effect on his interest.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Is the magic feature the element of loan on security inherent in hire-purchase (see Bridge, “Personal Property Security Law” [1992] J.B.L. 1, at p. 16)? If so, there might be room to extend Wickham Holdings to conditional sales. But even so, the decision still sits very uncomfortably with The Charlotte and The Sanix Aee, note 77 above.

⁸⁵ Plevin v. Henshall (1833) 10 Bing. 24.Google Scholar Similarly if the property or its proceeds is used to discharge P's obligations to third parties: e.g. ,A.L. Underwood v. Barclays Bank [1924] 1 K.B. 775.Google Scholar But note this is limited to payments on account of damages, or made out of the proceeds of the goods; the principle does not apply generally, and other payments arc apparently ignored. See the remarkable case of Hunter BNZ Finance v. ANZ [1990] V.R. 41, below at note 87.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Thus a bank can reduce the damages payable for conversion of a cheque by showing that it collected the cheque on behalf of a creditor of the plaintiff whose debt was thereby discharged: see generally Bannatyne v. Mclver [1906] 1 K.B. 103Google Scholar and Lloyds Bank v. Chartered Bank [1929] 1 K.B. 40Google Scholar (semble); and cf. Ass'fd Midland Corpn v. Bank of NSW [1983] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 533Google Scholar (affirmed without argument on this point, (1983) 51 A.L.R. 641). A similar result follows in so far as the proceeds of the cheque were used by the account-holder to discharge the owner's liability to third parties; A. L. Underwood v. Barclays Bank [1924] 1 K.B. 775, note 8 above.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Take, for example, the remarkable Australian decision in Hunter BNZ Finance v. ANZ Bank [1990] V.R. 41.Google Scholar P, as part of a financing transaction, provided X with a cheque in favour of Y. This was to be used in buying goods from Y on behalf of P, which P would then lease to X. X, a fraudster, misapplied the cheque by paying it into an account controlled by him, paid a few lease instalments on the phantom goods to P in order to allay suspicion, and disappeared. P sued D, X's bank, for conversion, and successfully recovered the full amount of the cheque, despite D's understandable argument that any loss P had suffered fell to be reduced by the amount of the instalments actually received from X. See too Lloyds Bank v. Chartered Bank of India [1929] 1 K.B. 40.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ I.e. (a) the desirability of avoiding multiple claims in respect of damage to the same goods, and (b) the fact that, since those without a proprietary interest cannot normally claim at all in negligence, damage might otherwise go wholly or partly uncompensatcd.

⁸⁹ The Charlotte [1908] P. 206, and note 77 above.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Gordon v. Harper (1796) 7 T.R. 9.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Nor, incidentally, is it subject to the statutory disregard of contributory negligence under section 11 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, since this only applies to actions for conversion or intentional trespass to goods.

⁹² See the East African case of Mukibi v. Bhavsar [1967] E.A.473.Google Scholar

⁹³ See Part II, above.

⁹⁴ See now Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, section 5.

⁹⁵ Subject to the point about actionability per se: sec note 2 above.

⁹⁶ And see the provisions of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, section 5.

⁹⁷ A point well made by the Law Reform Committee; sec its 12th Report on the Transfer of Title to Chattels, (1966 Cmnd. 2958), § X etseq, and its 18th Report, (1971 Cmnd 4774), § 81.

⁹⁸ A similar defence can be made of the ius terlii rule (not discussed in this article) disregarding the rights of third parties with a better title than the plaintiff. In any case this is now an insignificant rule in practice, since by virtue of section 8 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 it is disapplicd except where the identity of the third parly is unclear.