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Interpreting the Disability Ground of the Abortion Act

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2005

Rosamund Scott*
Affiliation:
School of Law and Centre of Medical Law and Ethics, King’s College London

Extract

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“Not only would it be a bold and brave judge … who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting under the Abortion Act 1967, but I think he would really be a foolish judge who would try to do any such thing, unless, possibly, where there is clear bad faith and an obvious attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence.” So said Sir George Baker P. in Paton v. B.P.A.S. and his view has been repeated at apposite judicial moments in subsequent cases. Recently, however, a legal attempt was indeed made to question the discretion of doctors in Jepson v. The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary. Reverend Joanna Jepson asked the West Mercia Police to investigate doctors who had authorised an abortion for bilateral cleft lip and palate at 28 weeks under the disability ground of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990). Abortion is legal under that section if two doctors have formed an opinion in good faith that “there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”.

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2005