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Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

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Extract

In the phrase “moral responsibility”, the term “moral” can register two different ideas. On the one hand, it may introduce a particular field of application and a corresponding class of consequences, which are informal and social rather than formal and supported by force. Used in this way, “moral responsibility” is distinguished from legal responsibility. A quite different use of the term is involved when “moral” is introduced to imply a certain basis of assessment, one that places particular emphasis on the voluntary. In this sense, moralresponsibility can be proposed as a basis of assessment even when what is in question is legal responsibility, for instance in relation to the criminal law.

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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1997

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