¹ 21 ‘Laws of England’ (Halsbury), § 843; Garrett, ‘Nuisances’ (3rd ed. 1908), 4; Pearce & Meston, ‘Nuisances’ (1926), 1.

² Pollock & Maitland, ii, 534, n. 2.

³ Fol. 231b—235b.

⁴ Ibid. 220b—221.

⁵ ‘History of English Law,’ vii, 328—333.

⁶ Sury v. Pigot, Popham 166.

⁷ Elliotson v. Feetham (1835) 2 Bing. (N.O.) 134; Bliss v. Hall (1838) 4 Bing. (N.O.) 183; St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642.

⁸ E.g. Finch, ‘Law’ (1629), 187—188.

⁹ ‘Comm.’ iii, 216.

¹⁰ Ibid. iii, ch. xvi.

¹¹ For other definitions, see Pollock, , ‘Torts’ (13th ed. 1929)Google Scholar, 417; Salmond, , ‘Torts’ (7th ed. 1928)Google Scholar, 257, 372; Clerk, & Lindsell, , ‘Torts’ (8th ed. 1929)Google Scholar, 344.

¹² Sir John Salmond's objection to this inclusion was unhistorical, and is not maintained by his learned editor: ‘Torts,’ 372.

¹³ Glanvill, xiii, cc. 35—37.

¹⁴ Bracton, cc. 44, 45; ff. 232 seq. His earlier statements are not very clear, but c. 45 seems to justify the epitome given above.

¹⁵ F.N.B. 124 H.

¹⁶ 2 Inst. 405; accepted by Blackstone, ‘Comm.’ iii, 221—222.

¹⁷ F.N.B. 124 H. No such writ is traceable in the printed Reg. Brev., or in the lists of writs given in Holdsworth, ‘History of English Law,’ ii, App. V, 606, or in Bracton's ‘Note Book,’ or in Pollock & Maitland.

¹⁸ Blackstone, ‘Comm.’ iii, 222.

¹⁹ It is referred to in Y. B. Mich. 2 Hen. IV, f. 11, pl. 48, Br. Abr. Act. sur le Cas, 29, and Y. B. Mich. 11 Hen. IV, f. 25, pl. 48. Cf. Holdsworth, op. cit. iii, 27—28.

²⁰ In London, in the thirteenth century, an assize of twelve aldermen, with the mayor, could settle within a week disputes about fences between lands and blocking up the entrance to a shop or house. In Ipswich, pleas of nuisance were, in certain circumstances, free from the troublesome delay of essoins. Borough Customs, 18 S. S. vol. i, 245—249, 254. See too ‘Leet Jurisdiction in Norwich,’ 5 S. S. 56.

²¹ (1866) L. R. 1 Ex. 265, 279; affirmed by H. L. (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.

²² L. R. 1 Ex. at pp. 282—284.

²³ Tenant v. Goldwin (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 1089.

²⁴ Contra Salmond, ‘Torts,’ § 88 (4). But it is difficult to agree with the statement as to the four historical grounds of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. In three of them (liability for trespass, fire, and nuisance), it is too strong to say that absence of fault on the defendant's part was no defence. As to trespass and fire, see 42 L. Q. R. (1926), 44—51; as to nuisance, see Viner, Abr. Nusance (H), vol. xvi, 27 seq., where several cases are cited which show that defendant was not liable, because, in effect, he was ‘without fault’; see, too, Rolle Abr. Nusans, B 2, p. 137.

²⁵ 42 L. Q. R. (1926), 37—51. See too Scrutton, L.J. in St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v. Roberts (1928) 140Google Scholar L. T. 1. With equal inaccuracy liability for nuisance has been described as ‘absolute’: Pearce & Meston, ‘Nuisances,’ 24. To give no other example to the contrary, it is enough to cite Barker v. Herbert [1911] 2 K. B. 633, where it was held that a defendant is not liable for nuisance if he neither knew, nor could reasonably have known, that the nuisance had been created by a trespasser.

²⁶ And it is quite possible for the same set of facts to ground liability under Rylands v. Fletcher and liability for the tort of negligence: Att.-Gen. v. Cory Bros. Ltd. [1921] 1 A. C. 521.

²⁷ National Telephone Co. v. Baker [1893] 2 Ch. 186.

²⁸ Jones v. Llanrwst U. D. C. [1911] 1 Ch. 393; Parker J. regarded it as trespass' within Rylands v. Fletcher: Ibid. 402—403.

²⁹ Charing Cross etc. Co. v. London Hydraulic Power Co. [1913] 3 K. B. 442.

³⁰ Goodbody v. Popular Borough Council (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 1230.

³¹ Pontardawe R. D. C. v. Moore-Gwyn [1929] 1 Ch. 656.

³² Moulton, L. J. Fletcher in Wing v. L. G. O. Co. [1909] 2 K. B. 652, at pp. 665–668.Google Scholar

³³ Scrutton, L.J. in Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924] 1 K. B. 341, 356–357.Google Scholar

³⁴ Garrett, , ‘Nuisances’ (3rd ed. 1908)Google Scholar, 138 seq.; Pearce, & Meston, , ‘Nuisances’ (1926)Google Scholar, 19—20 (a species of nuisance concerned with ‘noxious or dangerous’ things).

³⁵ Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd. [1902] A. C. 381. So too with the escape of creosote: West v. Bristol Tramways Co. [1908] 2 K. B. 14.

³⁶ Knight v. Isle of Wight etc. Co. (1904) 73 L. J. Ch. 299

³⁷ Ballard v. Tomlinson (1884) 26 Ch. D. 194; (1885) 29 Ch. D. 115 (‘action to restrain the defendants from polluting the water coming to a well belonging to the plaintiff’).

³⁸ Campbell v. Paddington Borough Council [1911] 1 K. B. 869; Att.-Gen. v. Brighton etc. Association [1900] 1 Ch. 276.

³⁹ Harrold v. Watney [1898] 2 Q. B. 320; Barker v. Herbert [1911] 2 K. B. 633.

⁴⁰ Lyons v. Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch. 255.

⁴¹ Whatever be the reason for this, it is not because Rylands v. Fletcher refers only to the escape of tangible matter, for it applies to vibrations, which can scarcely be described as tangible.

⁴² Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co. [1914] 3 K. B. 772. See too Pollock, ‘Torts,’ 507, and editorial note in Salmond, ‘Torts,’ 374.

⁴³ Sir Frederick Pollock in 143 R. R. Pref. v—vi; Salmond, ‘Torts,’ § 93 (2) and note.

⁴⁴ Thompson v. Gibson (1841) 7 M. & W. 456.

⁴⁵ Salmond, ‘Torts,’ § 64.

⁴⁶ Rainham Chemical Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 A. C. 465; St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v. Roberts (1928) 140 L. T. 1, 5—6, 9; cf. Mr. W. T. S. Stallybrass's article on this case in 45 L. Q. R. (1929), 118.

⁴⁷ Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co. (1853) 2 E. & B. 767; Howland v. Dover Harbour Board (1898) 14 T. L. R. 355. Many of the decisions cited in the text-books on nuisance in this connexion are really on pure negligence; e.g. Pearce & Meston, 319 seq.; Garrett, 245 seq. Putting aside these, there is still a residuum of negligence cases in which the facts might equally well have been treated as constituting nuisance and apparently were so treated, and that is another source of embarrassment.

⁴⁸ Hole v. Sittingbourne Ry. Co. (1861) 6 H. & N. 488; Gray v. Pullen (1864) 5 B. & S. 970. So too where a statutory duty is assumed: Robinson v. Beaconsfield R. D. C. [1911] 1 Ch. 188.

⁴⁹ (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 321

⁵⁰ Cockburn C.J. Ibid. at p. 327. He gave no test for distinguishing expected' from ‘unexpected’ ‘injurious consequences,’ but at any rate he regarded Tarry v. Ashton (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 314 as an illustration of the principle. Cf. Clerk & Lindsell, ‘Torts’ (8th ed. 1929), 91, and Hill v. Tottenham U. D. C. (1898) 79 L. T. 495, and Pickard v. Smith (1861) 10 C. B. (n.s.) 470, for the difficulty of applying the rule.

⁵¹ Peachey v. Rowland (1853) 13 C. B. 182. (The headnote treats the case as one of nuisance.) Scrutton, L.J. in Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924]Google Scholar 1 K. B. 341, 355, said obiter that the occupier is liable for nuisance if an independent contractor acted for his benefit in creating the nuisance, though contrary to the terms of his employment. He cited Black v. Christchurch Finance Co. [1894] A. C. 48. But there the liability seems to have been of the Rylands v. Fletcher type.

⁵² Hoare & Co. v. McAlpine [1923] 1 Ch. 167. See Pollock, Torts,' 505, n. (g), and 39 L. Q. R. (1923) 145—146, for criticisms of this decision.

⁵³ Noble v. Harrison [1926] 2 K. B. 332.

⁵⁴ 3 Cambridge Law Journal (1929), 376—397.

⁵⁵ 42 L. Q. R. (1926), 148—201.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 197—198.

⁵⁷ Coupland v. Hardingham (1813) 3 Camp. 398.

⁵⁸ Wilkins v. Day (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 110.

⁵⁹ Gandy v. Jubber (1864) 5 B. & S. 78; Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson (1879) 4 App. Cas. 256.

⁶⁰ E.g. Blackburn J. in Tarry v. Ashton (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 314.

⁶¹ ‘“Nuisance” and “negligence” are different in their nature and consequences’: Fletcher, Moulton L.J. in Wing v. L. G. O. Co. [1909]Google Scholar 2 K. B. 652, 665. ‘The differences between cases of nuisance and cases of negligence must never be lost sight of’: Hamilton, L.J. in Latham v. Johnson [1913]Google Scholar 1 K. B. 398, 413. See too Pickford, L.J. in Wheeler v. Morris (1915)Google Scholar 84 L. J. K. B. 1435, 1438.

⁶² Isaac Walton & Co. v. Vanguard Motorbus Co. Ltd. (1908) 25 T. L. R. 13 (skidding motor omnibus); cf. Wing v. L. G. O. Co. [1909] 2 K. B. 652.

⁶³ Lindley L.J. in Rapier v. London Tramways Co. [1893] 2 Ch. 588, 600.

⁶⁴ Stockport W. W. Co. v. Potter (1861) 7 H. & N. 160.

⁶⁵ May v. Stoop (1909) 25 T. L. R. 262; Manchester Corporation v. Farnworth [1930] A. C. 171.

⁶⁶ Broder v. Saillard (1876) 2 Ch. D. 692.

⁶⁷ Barker v. Herbert [1911] 2 K. B. 633, especially Vaughan Williams J. at pp. 636—637. Barker v. Herbert was followed by Scrutton, L.J. in St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v. Roberts (1929)Google Scholar 140 L. T. 1, 7. See too Ilford U. D. C. v. Beal [1925] 1 K. B. 671, Smith v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1926) 135 L. T. 112. Humphries v. Cousins (1877) 2 C. P. D. 239 is not inconsistent, for it was really an application of Rylands v. Fletcher; Ilford U. D. C. v. Beal [1925] 1 K. B. at pp. 677—678. Cf. Scrutton, L.J. in Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924]Google Scholar 1 K. B. 341, 356; that decision illustrates the difficulty of deciding whether the defendant has been negligent or not.

⁶⁸ This was what the judge went near doing in Hole v. Barlow (1858) 4 C. B. (n.s.) 334, and perhaps that is why Bamford v. Turnley (next note) has been regarded as overruling it. But it is hard to discover exactly what the judges in later cases objected to in Hole v. Barlow, or why they regarded Bamford v. Turnley as overruling it, or how much of Hole v. Barlow is overruled.

⁶⁹ (1862) 31 L. J. Q. B. 286.

⁷⁰ ‘Every man is bound to use his own property in such a manner as not to injure the property of his neighbour, unless, by the lapse of a certain period of time, he has acquired a prescriptive right to do so. But the law does not regard trifling inconveniences; every thing must be looked at from a reasonable point of view: and therefore in an action for nuisance to property by noxious vapours arising on the land of another, the injury to be actionable must be such as visibly to diminish the value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it. In determining that question the time, locality, and all the circumstances should be taken into consideration’: (1863) 4 B. & S. 608, 616; 11 H. L. C. 642.

⁷¹ This is really the explanation of Fenna v. Clare (1894) 64 L. J. Q. B. 238, where the question of contributory negligence was left to the jury in a case of nuisance.

⁷² Romilly M.R. in Rochdale Canal Co v. King (1853) 22 L. J. Ch. 604, 606. See too Att.-Gen. v. Grand Junction Canal Co. [1909] 2 Ch. 505; Johnson v. Wyatt (1866) 33 L. J. Ch. 394; and, as to what constitutes acquiescence, Garrett, , ‘Nuisances’ (3rd ed. 1908), 399–401.Google Scholar Mere delay in suing, as distinct from acquiescence, is material only with respect to the Statute of Limitations: Jones v. Llanrwst U. D. C. [1911] 1 Ch. 393, 411. For laches, see A. L. Smith L.J. in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch. 287, 322.

⁷³ ‘Torts’ (13th ed. 1929), 417.

⁷⁴ ‘Torts’ (7th ed. 1928), § 58 (6).

⁷⁵ Y. B. 32 Lib. Ass. pl. 2; Br. Abr. Nusans 25 (assize of nuisance applies even if nuisance is on plaintiff's own land; and he is not driven to trespass or assize of novel disseisin: this is inconsistent with Bracton, ante, pp. 190—191); Paston J. obiter in Y. B. Mich. 19 Hen. VI, f. 29 (where nuisance is on plaintiff's own land, assize of nuisance, being a real action, must be preferred to trespass; which is a personal action).

⁷⁶ Y. B. Trin. 13 Hen. VII, f. 26, pl. 4.

⁷⁷ Preston v. Mercer, Hardres 60.

⁷⁸ Fortescue J. in Reynolds v. Clerk (1725) 8 Mod. 272.

⁷⁹ E.g. Courtney v. Collet (1697) 1 Ld. Raym. 272

⁸⁰ Blackstone J. in Scott v. Shepherd (1772) 2 W. Bl. 892, 897.

⁸¹ Scrutton, L.J., in St. Anne's Well Brewery Co. v. Roberts (1928)Google Scholar 140 L. T. 1, 6.

⁸² Holmes v. Wilson (1839) 10 Ad. & E. 503; the earlier nisi prius opinion of Lord Ellenborough C.J. in Lawrence v. Obee (1815) 1 Stark. 22 was cited in argument but ignored in the judgment; Hudson v. Nicholson (1839) 5 M. & W. 436.

⁸³ Identified by Sir Pollock, Frederick with the common law: ‘Torts’ (13th ed. 1929), 518.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ 42 L. Q. R. (1926), 46—50, where its history is sketched.

⁸⁵ 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 86. The Railway Fires Acts, 1905 and 1923, are not material here.

⁸⁶ Rolle, Viner, Comyns, Bacon.

⁸⁷ 42 L. Q. R. (1926), 184—201.

⁸⁸ Comyns, ‘Digest’ (5th ed. 1822) I, 411, classifies it under ‘Actions upon the case for negligence.’ In Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 3 Bing. (N.O.) 468, the idea that escape of fire might be treated as the tort of negligence seems to be emerging, but it was concealed behind the rule sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, and that futile scrap of Latin is usually cited in connexion with nuisance.

⁸⁹ Bankes, L.J. in Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919]Google Scholar 2 K. B. 43, 46; Scrutton, L.J. in Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924]Google Scholar 1 K. B. 341, 361.

⁹⁰ Ante, p. 194.

⁹¹ (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 733, 736.

⁹² Powell v. Fall (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 597; Gunter v. James (1908) 24 T. L. R. 868; Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919] 2 K. B. 43; Mansel v. Webb (1919) 88 L. J. K. B. 323; Job Edwards, Ltd. v. Birmingham Navigations [1924] 1 K. B. 341, 351—352 (Bankes L.J.).

⁹³ Black v. Christchurch Finance Co. [1894] A. C. 48.

⁹⁴ Y. B. Mich. 9 Edw. IV, ff. 35—36.

⁹⁵ [1924] 1 K. B. 341.

⁹⁶ But how can the fire be said to have ‘escaped’?

⁹⁷ At p. 852.

⁹⁸ If the fire is intentional it would be trespass or assault; e.g. deliberately throwing a lighted match on a haystack or in a man's face.