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PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: AN IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2007

Stephanie Palmer
Affiliation:
Fellow, Girton College, Cambridge

Extract

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The House of Lords decision in YL v. Birmingham City Council considers the issue of whatis a public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998. The question is acritical one as the Convention rights, contained in the Human Rights Act, aredirectly enforceable only against public authorities. The issue of whether abody is a public authority has proved highly controversial. The hiving-off ofmany traditional governmental functions through policies such as privatisation,outsourcing and projects under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has led toa blurring of the traditionally understood public-private distinction. Thechanged nature in the way that public services are delivered has led to sharplydivergent views among the judiciary about which functions are those of a publicnature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. This is evident in theYL judgment itself: a split decision,with two dissenting judgements. The division in the House reflects differentunderstandings of the operation of the Human Rights Act, the public-privatedistinction and, perhaps more fundamentally, competing ideological stances.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2007