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Rescission as a Self-Help Remedy: A Critical Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2001

Janet O'Sullivan*
Affiliation:
Selwyn College, Cambridge

Abstract

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Rescission (the process by which a voidable contract or other disposition is avoided) is frequently described as a remedy which can be effected both by judicial decree and by the act of the innocent party. This article seeks to explore the latter notion, that it is possible to rescind a contract or disposition by self-help means. It explains that the law is in some disarray, caused primarily by confusion between the dual historical development of rescission at law and in equity. Rescission was traditionally regarded as the act of the innocent party only for vitiating factors (such as fraud) actionable at common law, not those actionable in equity, but this separation was not maintained following the Judicature Acts. Moreover, there are practical and conceptual difficulties with the notion of rescission as a self-help remedy, both in the idea that rescission can be effected by the election of the innocent party without judicial intervention and that, even where judicial rescission is obtained, the court order is back-dated to the earlier date of the innocent party’s election. The principal difficulty arises when an executed or partly executed transaction is rescinded, for then there are restitutionary implications and implications for the security of third party title. The conclusion is that the notion of rescission as a self-help remedy serves only to confuse in the modern law of obligations and should be abandoned.

Information

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2000