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The Royal Prerogative Re-Visited*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Extract
Of the two most often-quoted definitions of the royal prerogative, Dicey's definition as “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown,” has often received the express or implied approval of the courts. Thus, besides the weight of the authority of its great author, the above definition also enjoys the privilege of official and almost universal recognition and acceptance. It was therefore with great diffidence that the present writer decided to “re-visit the prerogative” and examine it critically. Yet, he has done so in the belief that the passage of time is bound to have had some effect on a definition which is nearly ninety years old and which, when first published, naturally reflected the nineteenth-century theory on this subject.
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References
1 The other being Blackstone's Commentaries, I, 238.
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