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Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Prespective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Reinhard Zimmermann
Affiliation:
Professor of Private Law, Roman Law and Comparative Legal History, University of Regensburg. This is an amended and annotated version of a paper presented at the annual conference of the Society of Public Teachers of Law in Cambridge in September 1996. The theme of the conference was legislation. The present paper was preceded by a presentation by Neil MacCormick, focusing on theoretical aspects of statutory interpretation (for preliminary versions, see Argumentation and Interpretation in Law, (1995) 9 Argumentation 467 sqq.; Argumentation und Interpretation im Recht: “Rule Consequentialism” und rationale Rekonstruktion, in: Gunther Teubner (ed.), Enlscheidungsfolgen ahRechtsgriinde (1995), 39 sqq.).
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Extract

“All statutes contrary to the common law … are to be interpreted strictly and have to be accepted in the most exact manner as they stand, and speak”. “Statutes which repeal the [common] law, have to be interpreted most strictly, and cannot be extended to cases which are not expressed in them.” “Statutes … generally consist more in ‘thus I want and thus I command’ than in a regulation according to reason”; “they fade like the moon's shadows, and like the moon they wax and wane at the legislators' whim”. It may be thought that these four sentences refer to the approach traditionally adopted in England to the interpretation of statutes. But they do not. They encapsulate the attitude adopted by the learned lawyers of the older ius commune, particularly in 13th and 14th century Italy, and in 16th century Germany. An English colleague has suggested that “civilian lawyers regard our case law with admiration and our statute book with despair”.

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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1997

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