¹ I am much indebted to my learned friend, Dr. K. Lipstein for the references to Continental law, and to my learned friend, Dr. Glanville Williams, for the following references to some of the periodical literature, some of which is unfortunately not available in any of the leading English law libraries: A. B. Frey in 12 StLouis, Law Review (1927), 85–95Google Scholar; 83 Solicitors Journal (1939), 185 (pre-natal injury); Atkinson, Stanley B. in 20 Law Quarterly Review (1904), 134–159Google Scholar (life, birth and live-birth); 30 American Law Notes (01 1927), 183–184Google Scholar (Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611)Google Scholar; Straub, R. in 33 American Law Notes (02, 1930), 205–210Google Scholar (right of action for pre-natal injury); 9 Riv. di diritto privato (1939), 76 (viability of infant at time of injury); 31 Columbia Law Review (1931) 710–711 (procedural status of unborn infant); Anderson, W. H. in 14 Tennessee Law Review (04, 1936), 151–162Google Scholar (rights of action of unborn child); Andrews, G. W. Jr. in 2 Alabama Law Journal (07, 1927), 259–261Google Scholar (Stanford's case, supra); 1 Alberta Law Quarterly Review (1935), 166–167 (Leveille's case; see discussion on pp. 85, 86Google Scholar of this article); 33 Michigan Law Review, 414 (law of property); the discussions of Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan (Tex.), 47Google Scholar S. W. (2nd), 901, in 46 Harvard Law Review (1932), 344–345; 27 Illinois Law Review (Dec. 1932), 461–462; 20 Minnesota Law Review (Feb. 1936), 321–322; 11 Texas Law Review (Ap. 1933), 396–397; Comments on Villar v. Gilbey [1907] A. C. 139Google Scholar, in 23 Law Quarterly Review (1907), 254Google Scholar; 24 Law Quarterly Review (1908), 2; discussion of Elliot v. Joicey [1935] A. C. 209Google Scholar, in 13 Canadian Bar Review (1935), 594–601Google Scholar; 9 Australian Law Journal (1935), 294. See also Mr. J. V. Barry's article on The Child en Ventre sa Mère, 14 Australian Law Journal (02 14, 1941), 351–357.Google Scholar

² 25 Halsbury, Laws of England (2nd ed., 1937), 88, and authorities there cited.

³ See Viner, , Abridgment, vol. 9 (2nd ed., 1792), pp. 403–404Google Scholar (Title ‘Enfant (H. 8) En Ventre sa Mère’); Cruise, , Digest, vol. 6 (2nd ed., 1818), Index, 178Google Scholar (‘Infant in ventre matris’); note that the reference to ‘may be a devisee’ is wrongly given as ‘VI, 16’; it should be ‘VI, 19.’ Many authorities are cited in tho arguments and judgments in Doe d. Lancashire (1792) 5 T. R. 40.Google Scholar

⁴ Leach, V.-C. in Trower v. Butts (1823) 1 S. & St. 181, 184Google Scholar; cited with approval by Russell, Lord of Killowen, in Elliot v. Joicey [1935] A. C. 209, 218.Google Scholar

⁵ Blasson v. Blasson (1864) 2 De G. J. & S. 665Google Scholar; approved in Villar v. Gilbey [1907] A. C. 139Google Scholar, and Elliot v. Joicey (last note).

⁶ Re Wilmer's Trusts [1903] 2 Ch. 411.Google Scholar

⁷ [1935] A. C. 209.

⁸ 52 Law Quarterly Review (1936) 1–3; 13 Canadian Bar Review (1935) 594–601; 9 Australian Law Journal (1935) 294.

⁹ Fleta, Bk. I, c. 23, § 10, reproducing and clarifying a vague and obscure passage in Bracton (ed. Woodbine, , 1922), f. 121.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Y. B. Mich. 1 Ed. III, f. 23, pl. 18; 3 Lib. Ass. pl. 2.

¹¹ Fitzherbert, Abridgment, Corone, 263, citing Mich. 22 Ed. III, without further details.

¹² Bk. I, c. 13.

¹³ 3 Inst. 50.

¹⁴ Hale, , Historia Placitorum Coronae (ed. 1778), I, 433Google Scholar; Hawkins, , Pleas of the Crown (6th ed., 1777), I, 121Google Scholar; Blackstone, , Comm., IV, 198Google Scholar; East, , Pleas of the Crown (1803), I, 227–228Google Scholar; Chitty, , Criminal Law, III (2nd ed., 1826), 800Google Scholar, where the third count in an indictment is, in effect, for procuring abortion.

¹⁵ 17 T. L. R. 310.

¹⁸ R. v. Enoch (1833) 5 C. & P. 539Google Scholar; R. v. Wright (1841) 9 C. & P. 754.Google Scholar

¹⁷ R. v. Enoch (last note). So, too, R. v. Poulton (1832) 5 C. & P. 329Google Scholar, and R. v. Sellis (1837) 7 C. & P. 850.Google Scholar Brett J.'s direction in R. v. Handley (1875) 13 Cox, 79, 81Google Scholar, implies that separate breathing of the child is enough; but this cannot now be regarded as law.

¹⁸ R. v. Brain (1834) 6 C. & P. 350.Google Scholar

¹⁹ R. v. Trilloe (1842) 2Google ScholarMoody, C. C.260Google Scholar; R. v. Reeves (1839) 9Google Scholar C. & P. 25. Parke B. had left this point open in R. v. Crutchley (1833) 7 C. & P. 814.Google Scholar

²⁰ 24 & 25 Viet. c. 100, ss. 58, 59.

²¹ See the authorities cited in note 14, ante.

²² 1 Moody, C. C.346.Google Scholar

²³ 2 C. & K. 784, 788.

²⁴ See the authorities cited in note 14, ante, and add to them R. v. Izod (1904) 20 Cox, 690.Google Scholar

²⁵ 24 & 25 Viet. c. 100, ss. 58, 59.

²⁶ 21. Jac. I, c. 27.

²⁷ 6 Cox, 388, 390.

²⁸ R. v. Calmer, 9 Cox, 506.Google Scholar

²⁹ R. v. Hewitt (1866) 4 F. & F. 1101.Google Scholar

³⁰ 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 18.

³¹ E.g., R. v. Donoghue (1928) 97 L. J. K. B. 303.Google Scholar

³² 19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 34.

³³ Russell on Crime (9th ed., 1936), I, 595seq.Google Scholar

³⁴ Public Health Act, 1936 (26 Geo. V & 1 Ed. VIII, c. 49), s. 203, sub-s. (7).

³⁵ (1901) 17 T. L. R. 310; ante, p. 79.Google Scholar

³⁶ (1832) 1 Moody, C. C.346Google Scholar; ante, p. 79.Google Scholar

³⁷ Bowstead, , Agency (9th ed., 1938), 4–5.Google Scholar

³⁸ 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.

³⁹ The George and Richard (1871)Google Scholar L. R. 3 Ad. & E. 466. To the like effect is a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court: Mann v. Carlon (1940) V. L. R. 280Google Scholar; 26 A. L. B. 184 [cited in 14 Aust. L. J. at p. 356 (J. V. Barry's article)] A learned friend has suggested to me that the Fatal Accidents Act creates a right of action in tort in favour of the unborn child itself. The Act itself certainly does not do so. There are dicta in the decisions interpreting the Act that it creates a new cause of action, and in Nunan v. Southern Ry. [1924] 1 K. B. 223, 227, 229Google Scholar, all three L.JJ. in the C. A. said that the dependants of the deceased have a new and distinct action (i.e., distinct from that which deceased would have had). But this went farther than anything said in earlier decisions, nor is it consistent with the undoubted law (admitted in the same decision) that if the action by the deceased would have been barred, supposing that he had survived to sue it, by the statute of limitations or by his own contributory negligence, then there is no action under the Fatal Accidents Act. In view of this uncertainty as to the exact sense in which the action is distinet from that which the deceased could have maintained, and much more in view of the fact that Phillimore J., in The George and Richard (above), expressly said that it was the deceased's representative who acquired the new right of action, it would be unsafe to infer that it is the unborn child who acquires it.

⁴⁰ The principal Act is now 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 84 (1925).

⁴¹ Williams v. Ocean Coal Co., Ltd. [1907] 2Google Scholar K. B. 422. In Orrell Colliery Co. v. Schofield [1909] A. C. 433Google Scholar, this was extended to posthumous illegitimate children; so, too, Harris v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., Ltd. (1915)Google Scholar W. C. & Ins. Rep. 527.

⁴² [1901] 2 K. B. 669, 671; in some respects the report in 85 L. T. 126, is better.

⁴³ 85 L. T. at p. 127.

⁴⁴ 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 41.

⁴⁵ (1792) 5 T. R. 49, 63.

⁴⁶ (1795) 2 H. Blackst. 399, 401.

⁴⁷ E.g., Lord Hardwicke L.C. in Wallis v. Hodson (1740) 2 Atk. 114, 118.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ 28 L. R. (Ireland), 69.

⁴⁹ O'Brien C.J. expressly guarded himself against saying that in no circumstances could such a duty exist, and he seemed to think (at p. 77) that an action for assault might have been maintained by the child in R. v. Senior (1832) 1Google ScholarMoody, C. C.346Google Scholar (ante, p. 79)Google Scholar, if it had survived. Johnson J. denied any true analogy between criminal law and the law of tort.

⁵⁰ At p. 81.

⁵¹ (1933) 4 D. L. R. 337.

⁵² ‘Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.’

⁵³ ‘Qui in utero est, perinde ac si in rebus humanis esset custoditur, quotiens de commodis ipsius partus quaeritur.’ The learned judge also cited Digest, 1. 5. 26;: ‘Qui in utero sunt, in toto paene jure civili intellegentur in rerum natura esse.’

⁵⁴ 19 N. E. (2nd), 446.

⁵⁵ The reports of many of them are unfortunately not accessible to me, owing principally to the dislocation caused by the war.

⁵⁶ Dietrich v. Northampton (1884) 138Google Scholar Mass. 14; 52 Am. Rep. 242; Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital (1904) 184Google Scholar III. 359; 56 N. E. 638; 48 L. R. A. 225; 75 Am. St. Rep. 176; Drobner v. Peters (1921) 231Google Scholar N. Y. 220; 133 N. E. 567; 20 A. L. R. 1503; Neuman v. City of Detroit (1937) 281Google Scholar Mich. 60; 274 N. W. 710. In Montreal Tramways v. Leveille (1933) 4Google Scholar D. L. R. 337, 340 (ante, p. 85)Google Scholar, Lamont J. said that the only case to the contrary cited to the Court was Kine v. Zukerman, 4Google Scholar Pa. Dist. Rep. 227. As to cases denying the right of action, Lamont J. referred to several of those cited in 13 Tulane Law Review, 632–634, and added Gorman v. Budlong (1901) 49Google Scholar Atl. Rep. 704; Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1926) 108 So. Rep. 566.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Dietrich's case (last note); but cf. Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co. (1916) 164 Wis. 272.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. (1913) 154Google Scholar App. Div. 667; 139 N. Y. S. 367. That was one of the reasons given in the Irish decision, Walker v. G. N. Ry. of Ireland (1891) 28Google Scholar L. R. (Ireland), 69, which is considered ante, p. 84.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Drobner v. Peters, ante, note 56; Magnolia Coca Cola Go. v. Jordan (1935) 124Google Scholar Tex. 347; 78 S. W. (2nd) 944; 97 A. L. R. 1513. The learned writer in 13 Tulane Law Review, 632–634, considers that the question is still an open one in Louisiana, the law of which follows the civil law and not the common law; so far there has been no litigation on this point.

⁶⁰ Vol. IV (1939), § 869.

⁶¹ Çivil Code, Art. 721.

⁶² Art. 725, 906.

⁶³ Planiol, , Droit Civil (1939), IGoogle Scholar, §§ 366–367; Mazeaud, Responsabilité Civile (3rd ed., 1939), III, § 2409.

⁶⁴ Enneccerus, , Kipp, & Wolff, , Rechts, Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen (1928), I, 1, § 77.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ In commenting on the Austrian BGB. § 22, Ehrenzwei, gsays in System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts:Google Scholar ‘Das gilt nicht nur fur das Erbrecht, sondern z.B. auch wenn ein Kind im Mutterleibe—etwa durch einen Eisenbahnunfall—verletzt wird. Wenn es verstümmelt, aber lebendig geboren wird, kann er Ersatzensprüche erheben.’

⁶⁶ ‘Auch unerlaubte Handlung gegenüber dem nasciturus ist möglich’: Egger, , Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch (1930), I, p. 292.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Digest, 50. 16. 231; 1. 5. 26; 34. 5. 7.; 5. 4. 3; 1. 9. 7; 26. 5. 20 pr.

⁶⁸ [1932] A. C. 562.

⁶⁹ [1936] A. C. 85. The whole law on this is discussed in Winfield, , Text-Book of Tort (1937), § 163.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ 24 & 25 Geo. V, c. 41.

⁷¹ Lutterel's case, cited in Hale v. Hale (1692)Google Scholar Finch, Prec, in Ch., case 51; and in Musgrave v. Parry (1715)Google Scholar 2 Vern. 710. Even in modern times there are contradictory decisions on whether waste is or is not a tort: cf. Winfield, , Text-Book of Tort (1937), p. 199.Google Scholar