Impact statement
Marine plastic pollution is increasing, and it calls for an urgent global action. Yet, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process has repeatedly stalled. This perspective goes beyond technical environmental debates to highlight the political, economic and procedural obstacles underlying the recent INC deadlock. By highlighting how geopolitical divisions, economic dependencies and consensus-based procedures have prevented the adoption of a legally binding global plastic treaty, this article gives critical insights into the reasons for the stalled negotiations and guides policymakers, negotiators and civil society actors on the design of enforceable, equitable and context-sensitive measures to address the plastic crisis. The insights presented in this research offer immediate and practical value to a wide audience. Understanding these negotiating barriers enables stakeholders to rethink their diplomatic approaches, promote necessary procedural reforms and prioritise targeted economic safeguards for developing countries.
Introduction
With plastic pollution in the marine environment continuing to increase, it has become essential to establish a robust legal framework for plastic management. Despite the problem of plastic entering the environment being first reported by the scientific community more than 50 years ago (Carpenter and Smith, Reference Carpenter and Smith1972), and with the growing scientific awareness associated with the increase in plastic pollution over the past decades, early initiatives were largely disjointed and lacked binding commitments, reflecting the complexity of managing a cross-border issue involving multiple sectors and jurisdictions. This gap has led to the gradual evolution of international legal and policy frameworks aimed at improving coordination, accountability and prevention.
Legal and policy instruments, ranging from local to global scale, that directly or indirectly address plastic pollution in the marine environment do exist. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL, 1973), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), as well as many other seas conventions and policies (e.g., GPA, 1995; GPML, 2012; Shevealy et al., Reference Shevealy, Courtney and Parks2012) address aspects of plastic pollution and waste management. Despite this dense architecture, the overall framework remains fragmented, as these instruments have different scopes of application and objectives (e.g., land-based activities, ship-based pollution, biodiversity-oriented and waste-focused), and many of them were not specifically designed to target plastic pollution. This creates gaps and overlaps, thus complicating coordination (Raubenheimer et al., Reference Raubenheimer, Oral and McIlgorm2017; Maes et al., Reference Maes, Wienrich, Weiand and Cowan2023). Many obligations are formulated in soft-law language with weak or absent enforcement or compliance mechanisms (Poto et al., Reference Poto, Elvevoll, Sundset, Eilertsen, Morel and Jensen2021). In light of this, and with the overwhelming scientific evidence of the threat posed by plastic pollution, it became increasingly clear that a dedicated instrument was needed to address plastic throughout its entire life cycle.
The United Nations Environment Assembly adopted Resolution 5/14 in March 2022, titled ‘End plastic pollution: towards an internationally legally binding instrument’ (UNEP, 2022). The Resolution established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) mandated to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including the marine environment, through a comprehensive approach addressing the full life cycle of plastic (UNEP, 2022). This was the first initiative to focus primarily on plastic, encompassing everything from raw materials extraction to disposal, thereby addressing upstream sources. However, the INC failed to complete its work by the deadline initially set for the end of 2024.
We argue that this deadlock reflects not only divergent political priorities across states, but also structural features of how the negotiations and multilateral environmental governance are designed. After providing a factual overview of the INC negotiating process to date, this article analyses the political and structural factors behind the deadlock and considers possible future pathways while discussing some practical measures to reduce global plastic dependency while a binding treaty remains under negotiation.
The INC negotiations process
INC-1 to INC-5.1
The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) began its work in 2022 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, with the convening of a first meeting (INC-1, 28 November–2 December 2022) (UNEP, 2025a). The INC held several sessions: INC-1 (28 November–2 December 2022), INC-2 (29 May–2 June 2023), INC-3 (13–19 November 2023), INC-4 (23–29 April 2024), INC-5.1 (25 November–1 December 2024) and INC-5.2 (5–14 August 2025) (UNEP, 2025a). Multiple texts were drafted, but progress over the sessions remained slow, turning the INC into a unique window onto the structural and political factors that limit global plastics governance. From the very first session, priorities diverged, and negotiators understood that they had to reconcile fundamentally incompatible visions of what the treaty should achieve. Even basic definitions, such as that of ‘plastic’, were contested. INC-5.1 was intended as the final round. However, many elements remained in brackets pending future amendments, and certain crucial issues, such as the scope of the treaty itself or the nature of the measures, remained unresolved, preventing consensus from being reached (IISD, 2024a).
INC-5.2 and INC-5.3
The INC-5.2 was held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 5 to 14 August 2025 (UNEP, 2025a). Ten days of intensive discussion and negotiations ended with no consensus (Cowan et al., Reference Cowan, Fossbakk, Fischer, Nütz, Tiller and Maes2026). Key definitions such as ‘plastic’ and ‘plastic pollution’ and critical articles such as Article 6 on sustainable production and consumption of plastic material were deleted from the draft text (i.e., Article 6 was present in UNEP [2025b] but removed in the following revised text of UNEP [2025c]), illustrating high contention and lack of current consensus. Fundamental issues such as the scope of the treaty also did not receive consensus. Tuvalu, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, expressed concern that ‘we have gone backwards to the point that there are far too many brackets, more than 1,000’ (PSIDS, 2025). The INC did not meet its timeline set to reach an agreement, and the negotiations remain ongoing. The two drafts submitted during the session by the INC Chair were rejected by the members of the Committee, and the Busan text from INC-5.1 remains the most recent negotiating text agreed by the Committee to serve as the basis for further negotiations (CIEL, 2026). Several causes were identified: an over-ambitious timeline, structural economic divides, a lack of workable middle ground and capacity gaps (Guo and Hu, Reference Guo and Hu2025; Cowan et al., Reference Cowan, Fossbakk, Fischer, Nütz, Tiller and Maes2026). A seventh round of meetings (INC-5.3) took place as a 1-day session in February 2026, though no negotiations were held (UNEP, 2025d). Following the former INC Chair’s resignation, Ambassador Julio Cordano was elected as Chair and Linroy Christian as Vice-Chair (UNEP, 2025d).
The deadlock
Analyses of the negotiations at the INC often refer to ‘high ambitious states’ or the ‘high ambition coalition’, and the ‘low ambition states’ or ‘like-minded group’. They are not formally recognised negotiating groups, but rather informal coalitions of countries whose alignments are fluid and vary depending on the issue discussed, which helps facilitate understanding of the process and the issues at stake. However, the underlying divisions are real. The European Union, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, most African and Pacific states and several Latin American states seek a strong legally binding treaty addressing the full life cycle of plastic (High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, 2026). Ghana, speaking on behalf of African states, called for an ‘enforceable framework’ with ‘ambitious, binding obligations to end plastic pollution’ (Ghana, 2025). The European Union recalled that ‘to effectively end plastic pollution, we must address it at its very source’ and supported global, legally binding measures to gradually phase out plastic products that are most harmful to human health and ecosystems (European Union, 2025). Similar positions were expressed by Pacific Small Island Developing States and several Latin American countries, which highlighted their particular vulnerability to plastic pollution and the need for global agreement that ‘covers the full life cycle of plastics as identified in UNEA Resolution 5/14’ and ‘promotes sustainable production, establishes effective controls on plastic pollution, and thereby promotes product design based on circular economy principles, strengthening waste management and handling’ (Chile, 2025; PSIDS, 2025).
Other states, primarily petrochemical-exporting states such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait, rejected upstream limits and sought to limit the treaty’s scope to downstream measures. They frequently invoked differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances to justify varying national obligations. India’s statement delivered during the plenary on 9 August exemplifies this position. India sought to narrow the treaty’s scope to ‘plastic pollution only’, rejecting any upstream measure and insisting on implementation ‘in a nationally driven manner’; moreover, India requested an article on reservations to annexures, thereby enabling states to interpret or exclude obligations (Government of India, 2025).
The fluidity is visible with states conventionally placed in a ‘middle’ position, such as China, whose position varied substantially depending on the issue under discussion. During INC-5, for instance, China supported measures aimed at strengthening the management of plastic products, while insisting on taking into account national circumstances and capabilities, and proposed that any global measure proposed by a Party concerning certain plastic products should be examined by a scientific, technical, economic and social committee under the Conference of the Parties (IISD, 2024b). Key points of divergence included the treaty’s scope (full life cycle versus downstream focus), its legal nature (binding versus voluntary), financing mechanisms (including the ‘re-categorisation of developing countries’) and differentiated responsibilities. As a result, negotiations reached a deadlock: delegations left Geneva without the consensus required to adopt a treaty text and without having confirmed when the process would continue, leaving uncertainty as to when and how negotiations would resume. It primarily reflects the frustration and disappointment of high-ambition states and observers, rather than failure of the entire process. The deadlock is also a result of the dynamics described above. These divergences exposed not only a lack of political alignment, but also deeper structural issues within the negotiation framework itself and within the architecture of global environmental governance. Consensus-based decision-making can prolong the presence of texts in brackets and delay convergence on key provisions, particularly where positions diverge on the scope of the treaty and upstream controls (Dauvergne and Allan, Reference Dauvergne and Allan2025). Consensus is required, allowing a minority of states to oppose the specific provisions that do not align with their political priorities. The consensus rule determines the maximum level of ambition that a treaty can achieve. This explains why, even though a majority of states are in favour of a strong treaty addressing upstream measures, no final agreement has yet been reached, and the post-INC-5.2 draft remains heavily bracketed. This is not unique to the plastic treaty and is typical of multilateral environmental agreements, with the INC process illustrating how the international system is currently addressing environmental issues that require global action. The architecture making this universal participation possible limits what can be hoped to be achieved.
Finally, non-state actors also influenced the outcome of the negotiations. Industry lobbyists, in particular those of the major petrochemical companies, implemented a series of targeted initiatives aimed at delegations, tried to influence the drafting of texts and lobbied to limit the scope of the treaty to downstream interventions (CIEL, 2025). These efforts accentuated structural power asymmetries and contributed to procedural deadlocks. Political and economic barriers are closely tied to the global dependence of plastics production on fossil fuels. This dependence ties the future of plastics to the energy and petrochemical industries, and shapes negotiating positions on upstream measures. Petro-states have strong incentives to oppose binding restrictions, making upstream measures politically sensitive and economically complex (UNEP, 2021; Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Symeonides, Raps and Dunlop2023). These economic realities intersect with equity considerations: low- and middle-income countries face budgetary constraints and limited technical capacity, which determines their needs in terms of financing, technology transfer and support mechanisms in order to fulfil ambitious commitments (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, De Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025; Guo and Hu, Reference Guo and Hu2025).
Future directions
The legal and procedural pathways
Despite repeated appeals for compromise and cooperation (UNEP, 2025e), the INC did not conclude with agreement on a final treaty text. However, it is noteworthy that numerous states expressed the need for and their willingness to adopt a strong treaty, as evidenced in INC-5.1 (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Carney Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, De Groot, Farrelly, Grilli, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggart, Tiller, Villarrubia-Gómez and Vince2025). Moreover, a 2-year deadline was highly ambitious, especially for multilateral negotiations in international environmental matters. For example, the Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013), which was also guided by the UN Environment Programme and addresses the entire value chain of mercury (from production to waste), required 4 years of negotiation. When fundamental issues such as the scope of the treaty remain unresolved, it is unlikely that negotiations can produce a strong treaty within such a short timeframe.
Several pathways forward merit consideration. A third round of negotiations building on the work completed in INC-5.2 would preserve universality; however, consensus-based procedures can enable prolonged deadlock when parties hold fundamentally different positions on treaty scope and upstream measures, and without replacing consensus-based decision-making with majority voting, the result could be a weak treaty (Dauvergne and Allan, Reference Dauvergne and Allan2025). Majority voting could favour the adoption of a more ambitious treaty, but at the cost of participation by certain states, likely those making significant contributions to plastic pollution. Alternatively, states supportive of a legally binding treaty addressing the full life cycle of plastic could pursue negotiations outside the United Nations system. While experts often identify this as the most realistic or optimal path (Sanderson, Reference Sanderson2025), it would sacrifice universality for ambition. The so-called start-and-strengthen approach, that is, the adoption of a convention with binding core obligations that will later be strengthened through protocols, annexes, amendments or COP decisions, could provide a possible way forward by generating large participation without capping ambition (CIEL, 2026). It has indeed been used in several multilateral environmental agreements, including the climate regime developed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992).
Other approaches include developing ‘non-binding statements, declarations, and recommendations’ (Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Symeonides, Raps and Dunlop2023), though their effectiveness remains questionable. Another avenue would be to review, strengthen and harmonise the existing regime on plastic. Improving coherence among these instruments and strengthening implementation mechanisms would be appropriate, yet not without challenges (e.g., none of them was designed to cover the full life cycle of plastic or upstream measures, and their institutional autonomy further complicates a unified reform). Finally, the entry into force of the BBNJ (Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction treaty) also provides a useful instrument. Although not directly addressing plastic pollution, it could provide a valuable framework for addressing plastic pollution in areas beyond national jurisdiction in the absence of a specific treaty. The BBNJ establishes frameworks for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) in the high seas. For example, it could require the assessment of planned activities, such as fishing or shipping, for their potential to generate plastic debris. MPAs established under the BBNJ could target areas where marine litter accumulates, which would enable the implementation of restrictions on activities that contribute to plastic pollution.
Decentralised approaches addressing the plastic crisis
While awaiting a comprehensive treaty, we believe that there are existing usable approaches to reduce plastic reliance and to slow down the plastic pollution crisis by limiting the dependency on plastic materials. It is crucial to distinguish between reducing plastic pollution, which is a downstream waste management issue, and reducing plastic dependency, which requires upstream measures. Reducing this dependency at the national level can be as challenging as achieving global consensus, as countries with economies heavily reliant on fossil fuels often face similar political and economic resistance domestically when implementing downstream measures.
Nevertheless, raising public awareness, behavioural change and sustainable alternatives are critical options (De-la-Torre and Walker, Reference De-la-Torre and Walker2026), but must account for economic accessibility. Also, the implementation of restrictions and/or bans on single-use plastics, which are a significant first step towards reducing visible and non-essential waste, must be accompanied by viable and affordable alternatives, as well as effective monitoring and enforcement procedures.
A sustainable transition requires integrating bans with circular economy strategies that reduce downstream pollution. However, circularity is undermined by the global trade in plastic waste, whereby developed countries export large quantities of plastic to low- and middle-income countries (Brooks et al., Reference Brooks, Wang and Jambeck2018; Zhao et al., Reference Zhao, Qi, Wang, Du and Shi2022), often under the guise of recycling. High-consumption economies, largely concentrated in the Global North, have historically driven the expansion of single-use plastic markets, while a significant share of environmental and health burdens associated with plastic waste management is borne by low- and middle-income countries where collection, treatment and regulatory capacity may be limited (UNEP, 2021; OECD, 2022; Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Symeonides, Raps and Dunlop2023). These inequalities are amplified by cross-border movements of plastic waste and secondary materials, which can shift end-of-life burdens across national borders even when framed as ‘recycling’ trade (Brooks et al., Reference Brooks, Wang and Jambeck2018; Zhao et al., Reference Zhao, Qi, Wang, Du and Shi2022). Tackling marine plastic pollution therefore requires coordinated action at national and international levels. Bans must be complemented by circular economy policies that reduce production and promote reuse, while the global trade in plastic waste must be strictly regulated, with transparency, monitoring and the strengthening of national recycling capacity in exporting countries (Gündoğdu et al., Reference Gündoğdu, Puckett, Gedik, Terzi and Öztürk2025). Recent legislative developments in developed regions, such as the European Union’s new Waste Shipment Regulation and DIWASS platform, aim to improve the tracking of waste shipments, facilitate the shipment of waste intended for recycling and tackle illegal waste shipments (European Commission, 2026).
Ultimately, the fact that decentralised national measures face the same structural and economic barriers that led to the INC deadlock underscores why an ambitious, universally binding treaty remains indispensable to mandate coordinated global measures to address the plastic threat. It is also essential that the role of independent science and the participation of observers are given central attention in future INC negotiations, ensuring that the treaty negotiations are guided by robust and independent scientific evidence, rather than by industry influence.
Conclusion
The INC process illustrates both the growing recognition of marine plastic pollution as a global governance challenge and the structural constraints that characterise multilateral environmental negotiations. The deadlock reached at INC-5.2 reflects the interaction of closely linked barriers, such as the economic dependence on fossil fuel plastic production and the procedural rules of consensus-based decision-making, which allow a minority of states to block provisions they do not find favourable. These barriers reinforce one another and cannot be separated. While it is still uncertain how the process will continue, several pathways are possible. However, they all involve a compromise between universal participation and ambition. The INC shows that political economy, procedural design and equity considerations are as critical as scientific evidence in shaping the future of plastic governance, and must be taken into account to ensure the success of a robust plastic treaty.
Open peer review
To view the open peer review materials for this article, please visit http://doi.org/10.1017/plc.2026.10064.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Quentin Hanich for the suggestions that improved this manuscript.
Author contribution
Conceptualization: M.L., P.C.; Methodology: M.L., P.C.; Project administration: P.C.; Supervision: P.C., G.S.; Writing – original draft: M.L., P.C., G.S.; Writing – review and editing: M.L., P.C., G.S.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work or the opinions reported in this article.
Data availability statement
Data availability is not applicable to this article.
Funding statement
This study did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies.
Open access
Comments
To the editorial board of Cambridge Prisms: Plastics
Wednesday 08 of April 2026
Dear Editors,
Please find attached the submission of our article titled “A critical policy and governance description of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) plastics treaty negotiations” for consideration by Cambridge Prisms: Plastics.
This article presents our personal point of view on the evolution and outcome of the INC negotiations on plastic pollution. Our intention is to share the authors' reflections on why these negotiations have stalled, drawing on the INC documentation, including negotiating texts, Chair’s drafts, national and group plenary statements, and submissions published by the United Nations Environment Programme, complemented by reports from intergovernmental observers and peer-reviewed policy scholarship. We also discuss the implications for treaty design, particularly the need for clearer definitions, enforceable compliance and financing arrangements, and approaches that address upstream drivers while supporting equitable implementation. Our aim is to provide guidance to policymakers, negotiators and civil society on approaches that could make future global plastics governance more effective, enforceable and equitable.
We confirm that this work is original and has not been published elsewhere, nor is it currently under consideration for publication elsewhere. We have no conflicts of interest to disclose.
Sincerely
Paolo Cappa (on behalf of all authors)